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Introduction 
A  renewed  railway  sector  is  vital  for  the  future  of Europe's  transport  system.  The 
Common Transport Policy therefore aims at reversing rail's long-term decline in market 
share by creating the conditions for an expanding, competitive, customer-orientated rail 
system. Achieving the goal of sustainable mobility depends crucially on the revitalisation 
of  this environmentally friendly sector. 
To compete with other modes of  transport, the railways have to operate first and foremost 
as  businesses,  with  a  strong  orientation  to  the  markets.  They  need  independent 
management and sound finances,  and  must progressively be  exposed to  market forces 
like other sectors.  This implies a re-definition of the relationship between the State and 
the railways and a clear division of responsibilities. This Communication proposes a new 
regulatory framework for the conditions of access to infrastructure. Later this year it will 
be  complemented  by  proposals  on  finances  (also  covering  public  services)  and  a 
communication on the integration of national systems. This will cover not only technical 
harmonisation  but  also  social  aspects,  in  particular  the  qualifications  of train  crews 
operating  across  frontiers.  The  Commission  will  also  launch  a  major  study  on  the 
changing  employment  opportunities  in  the  railway  sector,  focussing  on  job  profiles, 
educational  levels  and  investments  in  human  resources.  These  three  packages  would 
make a major contribution to  ensuring that rail  transport can compete effectively with 
other modes of  transport and provide the services which the citizens of Europe require. 
The  Commission  recognises  the  public  service  role  of the  rail  sector.  The  regulatory 
framework must ensure that public services can be efficiently provided and that railway 
infrastructure is maintained and expanded where it is needed across the Community. This 
essential objective  is  most  likely to  be  achieved within a model  where the quality and 
value  of rail  services  improves  and  where  market  forces  are  allowed  to  improve 
competitiveness wherever this is possible. 
Directive 911440/EEC was a first step in the revitalisation of the Community's railways. 
It  opened the market to  competing railway undertakings and it  allowed them to operate 
trains on the same lines as incumbent rail operators. In addition, it required management 
independence and the separation of infrastructure management and transport operations, 
at  least  in  the  accounts.  As  a result,  the costs of utilising  infrastructure are  now being 
identified and charges will be levied on railway operators. Financial and other contractual 
arrangements  that  used  to  be hidden within one enterprise  are  now  becoming explicit 
transactions between several enterprises. 
The  Directive  is,  however,  limited  in  scope.  Some Member States  have  chosen to  go 
beyond  the  Directive  to  establish  separate  bodies  for  infrastructure  management  and 
transport  operations  either  within  a  single  undertaking  or  in  separate  undertakings. 
Moreover,  some  Member  States  have  established  wider  access  rights  than  those 
contained  in  the  Directive  and  have  introduced  tendering  for  public  services. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Directive has provided only limited opening of  the 
market.  This is  perhaps  best  indicated  by the  fact  that  the  incumbent railway operator 
remains in a dominant position in all Member States. 
2 One reason for this appears to  be  that although useful rules have been defined, we  have 
not yet been able to ensure that their application is open and equitable. In particular, the 
bodies  responsible  for  implementing  the  rules  are  in  a  position  to  determine  the 
conditions  under which  undertakings enter the  market and  conduct their business.  The 
bodies responsible for implementing the rules must be independent in that they cannot be 
judge and party to decisions giving rise to a conflict of interest. If an incumbent operator 
has the dual roles of railway undertaking and regulatory body there is an inherent conflict 
of interest and this could be  considered inconsistent with  Articles  90.1  and  86  of the 
Treaty. This situation must change if  the rules of  access are to have substance. 
It is now essential to build on this first step by creating the conditions to  make the rights 
of access  effective.  The  proposals  in  this,  Communication have  two  underlying  aims. 
First, to ensure that all railway undertakings are treated in a fair and non-discriminatory 
way; second, to provide for the efficient and competitive use of infrastructure. 
A first step in this direction was taken with the adoption in 1995 of two complementary 
Directives, one on the licensing of railway undertakings1, and the other on the allocation 
of infrastructure  capacity  and  the  charging  of infrastructure  fees2.  These  directives 
established broad frameworks at Community level, but did not settle all regulatory issues. 
There  is  a  wide  agreement  that  the  rules  on  capacity  allocation  and  on  charging  in 
Directive  95/19/EC  should  be  expanded  and  completed  and  that  the  accounting 
separation required by Directive 91/440/EEC is not sufficient to guarantee fair treatment. 
In  its White Paper of 1996, "A strategy for revitalising the Community's railways"J, the 
Commission demonstrated the need  fully to  define the  conditions of access  to  railway 
infrastructure.  In  its  resolution  on  this  White  Paper,  the  Parliament  called  for  the 
accompanying  measures  needed  to  define  conditions  of access,  as  well  as  for  the 
progressive opening ofthe market4.  In its 1998 communication on the implementation of 
Directive  911440/EECS,  the  Commission  pointed  out  the  inadequacy  of  present 
arrangements and the widely shared view that the framework needed to be completed. 
Securing access is not sufficient. To ensure the efficient use of infrastructure, charging 
systems must be  economically sound and give the right signals to  railway undertakings 
and  infrastructure  managers.  To  develop  effective  charging  systems,  there  must  be 
transparency about the finances of infrastructure management. In capacity allocation, the 
needs of different users should  be  clarified, the  choices made explicit and  the  optimal 
solutions identified. Indeed, the whole process of drawing up and applying explicit rules 
would substantially contribute to efficiency. 
2 
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Council  Directive 95/18/EC of 19  June  1995  on  the  licensing of railway  undertakings,  OJ  L 143, 
27.6.1995. 
Council  Directive  95/ 19/EC  of 19  June  1995  on  the  allocation  of railway  infrastructure  and  the 
charging of infrastructure fees, OJ L 143, 27.6.1995. 
COM(96) 421  final. 
Resolution on the Commission's White Paper "A strategy for revitalising the Community's railways" 
and the Commissions Communication on the trans-European Freeways. A4-0412/97. 
Communication on the implementation and impact of Directive 911440/EEC on the development of the 
Community's railways and on access rights for rail freight COM( 1998) 202 final. 
3 The infrastructure package 
The Commission now proposes three measures to  define the conditions of utilisation of 
railway infrastructure: 
•  a  directive to  replace  the  provisions of Directive 95/19/EC on the  allocation of 
infrastructure capacity and on the charging of infrastructure fees; 
•  a  directive  to  amend  the  provisions  of Directive  911440/EEC  primarily  on  the 
separation of  accounts of infrastructure management and of transport operations; 
•  a  directive  to  widen  the  scope  of  Directive  95118/EC  on  the  licensing  of 
railway undertakings. 
Allocation of capacicy 
So far as the allocation of capacity is  concerned, the proposed directive would carefully 
define  the  rights of railway undertakings and of the  infrastructure manager and would 
establish a  \Vell-detined process for  the preparation of timetables.  Under this,  different 
operators would be able to  bid for capacity, which would be awarded according to clear 
rules and criteria known in advance. The process would be designed to  resolve conflicts 
between requests for capacity and to overcome problems of scarcity, in ways that respects 
the rights of all  the  applicants. The directive would also ensure that the allocation was 
performed by a body not providing transport services itself, and that there was a right of 
appeal.  As  well  as  ensuring  fair  and  non-discriminatory  treatment  in  this  way,  the 
allocation process would promote efficiency. It  would make clear the needs of different 
users,  including the  infrastructure manager,  the  scope  for  flexibility,  the real  conflicts, 
the choices to  be  made and the different solutions. More specifically, it  would promote 
the  efficient  use  of  scarce  capacity  by  requiring  capacity  analyses  and  capacity 
enhancement plans. 
Charging of infrastructure fees 
As for the charging of infrastructure fees, the proposal is  to base, in principle, charges on 
marginal cost, that is the cost which is directly incurred as the result of the operation of a 
train. [t is a generally accepted tenet of economic theory that this gives the optimal use of 
resources,  assuming  various  conditions  are  met.  However  the  directive  would  allow 
charges to  be  increased and  modulated to  attain other objectives:  a  higher rate of cost 
recovery than under marginal cost pricing, inclusion of external costs and the resolution 
of problems of scarcity.  In this way,  a good balance could be struck between economic 
efticiency and  the  achievement of wider aims of transport policy.  The directive would 
also require perfonnance schemes to be  included in charging systems with incentives for 
good performance and penalties for bad; this would greatly promote efficiency. 
[n  addition.  the  proposed  directive  would  help  ensure  fair  treatment,  by  obliging  the 
publication of charging sch~mes in advance and the provision of information on how they 
are  calculated.  This  in  itself would  be  a  major advance,  but there  would  be  specific 
provisions to  guarantee fair  treatment. The directive would create safeguards to  protect 
railway undertakings against the abuse of monopoly by an infrastructure manager, when 
it  sets charges.  It  would also establish safeguards to  prevent fixed charges and discounts 
4 working against smaller railway undertakings; this would help protect newcomers to the 
market as they tend to operate on a small scale. 
Separation of accounts 
An  essential  provision  of Directive  911440/EEC  is  the  separation  of infrastructure 
management and transport operations at least in the accounts. This is  meant to achieve 
several aims: efficient operation of two different but linked activities, transparency about 
the  use  of public money and a solid foundation for  infrastructure charges.  However, in 
the case of integrated railways, at most profit and loss accounts have been drawn up for 
infrastructure  management,  but  not  balance  sheets,  crucial  as  they  are  in  so  capital 
intensive  a  sector.  The amending directive  proposed  would  therefore  clarify the  legal 
situation and require the separation of both profit and loss accounts and balance sheets. 
Moreover the Community needs to  go  further  in  putting railway finances  on a  sound 
footing,  by  creating a  comprehensive  framework,  including rules  on restructuring.  For 
this,  transparency  about  the  finances  of different  transport  operations  is  essential. 
Passenger and freight transport serve different markets and are financed in different ways. 
In the case of passenger transport, public services play a major role and compensation for 
these  accounts  for  a  large  part  of income;  this  is  not  the  case  with  freight  whose 
commercial orientation is  mure direct. To help the efficient management of each and to 
create greater transparency about their finances,  their accounts should be separated; this 
too is proposed in the directive to amend Directive 911440/EEC. 
Licensing of railway undertakings 
Directive  95/18/EC  on  licensing  only  applies  to  railway  undertakings  providing  the 
services referred to  by Article I 0 of  Directive 91 /440/EEC, that is the services covered by 
access rights. Also railway undertakings whose activities are limited to urban, suburban 
or  regiomil  services do  not  fall  under the  Directive.  However,  various  Member States 
have  extended access rights  to  infrastructure beyond those of Directive 911440/EEC or 
opened  urban,  suburban or regional  services to  tender.  To  ensure that  these  rights  are 
applied  to  all  railway  undertakings  established  in  the  Community  fairly  and  without 
discrimination,  Community  rules  on  licenses  should  be  extended  to  all  such  railway 
undertakings. This is the purpose of  the proposed directive. 
Avoidance of conflict of interest 
Although  various  Member  States  have  created  distinct  legal  entities,  others  have 
maintained integrated railways that are responsible for both activities. In  this case,· there 
is  no  assurance that all  railway undertakings will  be  treated equitably when seeking to 
enter  the  market.  If integrated  railways  are  responsible  for  setting  rules  for  charging, 
allocating  capacity,  timetabling  safety  regulation,  or  licensing  they  determine  the 
conditions under which their competitors do their business. An infrastructure manager in 
such  a  railway  has  an  incentive  to  further  the  interests  of the  whole  undertaking, 
including  its  transport  services.  At the same time,  it  is  under an  obligation to  treat all 
railway undertakings equitably,  which creates a  cont1ict of interest.  The Commission's 
communication on  the  implementation and impact of Directive 91/440/EEC found  that 
potential new operators considered a barrier to entry the lack of guarantee that all railway 
undertakings  would  be  treated  fairly  and  without  discrimination  when  seeking  to  use 
railway  infrastructure  managed  by  integrated  railways.  Consequently,  the  proposed 
directives on the  allocation of infrastructure capacity and  the charging of infrastructure 
5 fees.  on  the  separation  of infrastructure  management  and  transport  operations  and  on 
licensing would provide that the functions giving rise to the conflicts of interest be made 
the responsibility of independent bodies that do not supply transport services themselves. 
Conclusion 
The  package of measures contained in  this  Communication meets the  widespread call 
for defining  the  conditions  of access  to  railway  infrastructure.  It  will  complement the 
rules  laid  down  in  Directive  911440/EEC.  The  package  is  necessary  whether  or  not 
further  liberalisation  of different  types  of railway  operations  is  introduced.  These 
rules would  indeed  provide  a  framework  within  which  more  liberalised  operations 
could be  introduced.  But  it  is  also  essential  for  making  the  existing  rights  of access 
work effectively. 
The objective of these proposals are the fair and non-discriminatory treatment of railway 
undertakings  and  the  efficient  use  of infrastructure.  However,  the  benefit  of these 
proposals,  if adopted,  would  be  more  far  reaching.  They  would  help  to  increase  the 
efficient use of railway infrastructure,  improve the competitiveness of rail  transport by 
improving the quality and pricing mechanisms for the infrastructure and thus increase the 
competitiveness of rail transport compared to other modes of  transport. 
If the  long-term  objective of revitalising  the  Community's railways,  both freight  and 
passenger,  is  to  be  achieved,  the  swift  adoption  of the  proposals  outlined  in  this 
Commun_ication  is  an essential  step.  The Commission will  come  forward  with  further 
complementary proposals in the course of the autumn which, taken together, will provide 
the essential underpinning for an efficient, competitive revitalised railway system within 
the Community. 
6 Proposal for a 
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
amending Directive 911440/EEC on the development 
of the Community's railways 
7 EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
Purpose of  oroposal 
1.  Directive  91/440/EEC  is  the  principal  measure  taken  by  the  Community  to 
develop  raq  transport.  Its  main  aims  are  to  create  a  framework  for  the 
de.velopment of railway undertakings that  operate  in  a commercial manner and 
adapt to the needs of the market and to begin the integration of the railway sector 
into  the  competitive  transport  market.  The  Directive  obliged  Member  States 
to ensure: 
the management independence of  railway undertakings; 
separation  between  infrastructure  management  and  transport  operations  at 
least in the accounts; 
the  reduction  of  the  railways'  debts  and  improvement  of  their 
financial situation; 
certain  access  rights  to  infrastructure  for  the  operation  of international 
services by railway undertakings. 
2.  Bqth the Commission's White Paper "A strategy for revitalising the Community's 
railways"'  and  its  "Communication  on  the  implementation  and  impact  of 
Directive 911440/EEC on the development of the Community's railways and on 
access  rights  for  rail  freight"2  identified certain shortcomings of the  Directive, 
which limit its impact and block the full achievement of  its objectives. The aim of 
this  proposal  is  to  strengthen  the  Directive  so  that  its  aims  are  better met.  At 
the same  time  the  Commission  is  presenting  proposals  for  guidelines  on 
infrastructure charges and on capacity allocation, which are intended to complete 
the framework for access to  infrastructure, in order to make effective the access 
rights created by the Directive; it is also presenting proposals on the licensing of 
railway undertakings. 
3.  One key element of the Directive is the separation of infrastructure management 
and transport operations at least in the accounts. There are several reasons for this: 
to further efficient operation of  two different but linked activities by clarifying the 
financial  results  of each,  to  make  the  use  of public  money  transparent,  as 
Member States support the railways in different ways and for different purposes, 
and  to  create  a  solid  foundation  for  infrastructure  charges  through  clear 
identification of costs and  revenues.  However the  Commission's Report on the 
implementation  and  impact  of Directive  911440/EEC  found  that  in  practice 
accounts  had  not  been  separated  fully,  except  for  the  railways  that have  been 
divided  into  separate  entities.  No  integrated  railway  had  drawn  up  separate 
balance sheets, but at most separate profit and loss accounts.  This is despite the 
fact that the railway sector is highly capital intensive, so balance sheets are vital 
I  COM(96) 421  final, 30.7  .1996. 
2  COM( 1998) 202 final, 31.3.1998. 
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for  any  financial  assessment  (for  a  number  not  even  separate  profit  and  loss 
accounts were available). Although Community legislation on company accounts 
in general and  on railway accounts in  particular3  creates obligations to  draw up 
both  profit  and  loss  accounts  and  balance  sheets,  it  is  worth  making  this 
requirement clear and explicit in the Directive for the reasons given. 
Putting  railway  finances  on  a  sound  footing  is  also  an  essential  part  of the 
Directive. It requires Member States to help reduce debt to a level which does not 
impede sound financial management. The Commission's "Communication on the 
implementation and  impact of Directive  91/440/EEC"  found  that  the  railways' 
debt position had  improved considerably, though debt service remained a heavy 
burden for  some.  However this is  only a beginning, and the Community has to 
create  a  full  framework  for  railway  finances,  including  rules  on  aid  for 
restructuring.  For  this,  transparency  about  the  finances  of different  transport 
operations is essential. Passenger and freight transport serve markets that differ in 
nature. In passenger transport, public services play a major role, and compensation 
from  the  authorities  represents a large  part of the  railways'  income.  In  freight, 
demands  come  directly  from  individual  customers,  and  the  State  does  not 
intervene  to  procure  public  services,  so  its  commercial  orientation  is  therefore 
more direct. This difference is widely recognised, as Member States are creating 
separate  companies  or  divisions  within  companies  for  passenger  and  freight 
services. The Commission believes that greater transparency is now needed about 
the  finances  of passenger  and  of freight  services  and  it  therefore  proposes  to 
modify the Directive to require separate accounts for each activity. 
Another requirement of  the Directive is to establish certain access rights to railway 
infrastructure for the provision of international services  by  railway undertakings 
established in  the Community or groupings of such enterprises.  For these to  be 
effective  all  railway  undertakings  must  be  treated  equitably  and  without 
discrimination when seeking access  to  infrastructure.  An  integrated railway that 
both  managed  infrastructure  and  supplied  transport  services,  would  have 
responsibility,  for  setting rules  for  charges,  allocating  capacity,  timetabling and 
regulating safety or licensing. In view of this they would determine the conditions 
under  which their competitors enter the  market  and  do  their  business  and  this 
could  be  considered  inconsistent  with  Articles  90.1  and  86  of the  Treaty.  An 
infrastructure  manager  in  an  integrated  railway  has  an  incentive  to  further  the 
interests of the whole undertaking, including its transport services, as well being 
under an an obligation to treat all providers of  transport equitably. This conflict of 
interest would be removed, if the functions that determine access to infrastructure 
were  carried  out by  an  independent  body  or undertaking  that  does  not  operate 
transport  services.  Integrated  railways  could  retain  the  other  activWes  of 
infrastructure management, as the same conflicts of interest would not arise. This 
proposal would amend Directive 911440/EEC to make the setting and enforcement 
of safety rules the responsibility of a body or an undertaking that does not itself 
supply  rail  transport  services.  The  Commission's  proposals  for  directives  on 
Fourth  Council  Directive of 25  July  1978  based  on  Article  54(3)(g)  of the  Treaty on the  annual 
accounts  of certain  types  of companies  (78/660/EEC).  OJ  L 222,  14.8.1978.  Council  Regulation 
(EEC) No 2830177 of 12 December 1977 on the measures necessary to achieve comparability between 
the accounting systems and annual accounts of  railway undertakings. 
9 infrastructure charges, capacity allocation and licensing would require the same 
thing for other functions. 
6.  Finally  it  is  worth  clarifying  certain  parts  of the  Directive,  in  the  light  of 
experience.  A  requirement  of the  Directive  is  to  give  railway  undertakings, 
(the undertakings that operate transport services) management independence and 
to  let  them  work  according  to  commercial  principles.  This  independence  and 
commercial  orientation  is  necessary  if rail  transport  is  to  compete  with other 
modes  and  realise  its  potential.  However  Member  States  may  legitimately 
intervene  in  infrastructure  questions  to  a  greater  extent;  indeed  the  Directive 
requires  Member  States  to  develop  national  railway  infrastructure,  taking  into 
account the  needs of the Community, when necessary.  Infrastructure  managers 
may also be given a regulatory function as well as that of managing their assets. 
This implies that a distinction should be made between railway undertakings and 
infrastructure management so far as commercial orientation and the role of the 
State are concerned, although both should be an entity independent of the State 
and should be free to manage their own affairs. 
Explanation of  individual articles 
7.  Article  I, second  indent.  This  modifies  the  summary of the  provisions of the 
Directive. [t  presently states that only separation of accounts is compulsory. The 
text should be amended to state that there should be full  separation of accounts 
and  separation of functions  that  determine  access  to  railway  infrastructure,  to 
reflect the amendments to Article 6. 
8.  Article 3, second indent. This makes it clear that the infrastructure manager may 
be a public or private undertaking, as well as a public body. 
9.  Article  6,  paragraph  1.  This  amended  text  would  clarify  that  separation  of 
accounts  between  transport  services  and  infrastructure  management  means 
separation of  both profit and loss accounts and of  balance sheets. 
10.  Article 7.  paragraph  1.  In order to ensure fair and non discriminatory access to 
infrastructure, this amendment would require that safety regulation be carried out 
by bodies or undertakings that do not supply rail transport services themselves and 
are  independent of bodies or undertakings doing so.  Article 7.  paragraphs 4.  5 
and 6.  These  new paragraphs  would  clarify that,  in  the  interests of efficiency, 
infrastructure  managers,  like  railway  undertakings  should  have  a  status 
independent of  the State, should have business plans and should be free to manage 
their  internal  affairs.  Nevertheless  Member  States  should  take  the  measures 
necessary for the development of their national infrastructure taking into account, 
where  necessary,  the  general  needs of the  Community, as already required  by 
Article 7, paragraph 1. 
11.  Article 9, paragraph 4. This would require separate accounts for passenger and for 
freight  transport  services,  to  promote  efficient  management  and  create 
transparency about the finance situation of  each. 
10 Subsidiarity 
12.  Competence. This proposal is put forward on the basis of Article 75 of the Treaty 
and is therefore the exclusive competence of the Community. It is an amendment 
of  an existing directive. 
13.  Means  of action.  The  Community  has  already  taken  legislative  action  on  the 
management  independence  of  railway  undertakings,  the  separation  of 
infrastructure management and transport operations and  access rights  to  railway 
infrastructure. As shown above these rules do not go sufficiently far to achieve the 
objectives of  Directive 91/440/EEC or need to be clarified to be effective. Further 
Community legislation is  therefore  needed  to  attain the  goals  set  and  to  avoid 
disparate national measures. 
14.  Form of legislation. As  in the case of the original legislation, a directive should 
strike the right balance  between harmonisation to  achieve  essential  Community 
objectives and recognition of differences between Member States in the situation 
and  organisation  of  the  railways  and  in  relations  between  the  State  and 
the Railways. 
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98/0265 (SYN) 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community,  and  in  particular 
Article 75 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal of the Commission4, 
Having regard to the opinion of  the· Economic and Social Committees, 
Acting  in  accordance  with  the  procedure  laid  down  in  Article  189c  of the  Treaty  in 
cooperationwith the European Parliament6, 
1.  Whereas Council Directive  91/440/EEC7  should  be  amended  to  take  account of 
experience  with  its  implementation  and  of developments  in  the  railway  sector 
since its adoption, in order to ensure that its objectives are achieved; 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
4 
5 
6 
1 
Whereas, in order to  promote the efficient operation and development of the two 
distinct  activities  of  provision  of  transport  services  and  of  infrastructure 
management,  tci  make  transparent  the  use  to  which public  funds  for  the  railway 
sector are put, and to create a solid basis for infrastructure charges, it  is necessary 
to  separate  both  the  profit  and  loss  accounts  and  the  balance  sheets  of the 
two. activities; 
Whereas  it  is  necessary  that,  where  railway  undertakings  and  the 
international groupings which  they  constitute  provide  the  services  referred  to  in 
Article  I  0 of Directive 91/440/EEC, they benefit fully  from 'the access rights laid 
down in that Article; 
Whereas, to this end, all railway undertakings and international groupings must he 
treated on a fair and non-discriminatory basis as concerns activities that condition 
access  to  infrastructure,  and,  consequently,  the  laying-do"'n and  enforcement of 
. _  safety  rules  should  be  carried  out  by  independent  bodies  or  undertakings  that 
themselves do not provide rail transport services; 
Whereas, to promote efficient management of infrastructure in the public interest, 
infrastructure  managers  s~ould be  giv~n a status  independent  of the  State,  and 
OJC 
OJC 
OJC 
OJ L 237, 24.8.1991, p. 25. 
12 freedom  to  manage  their internal  affairs,  while  Member States  should take  the 
necessary measures for the development and the safe use of  railway infrastructure; 
6.  Whereas  to  promote  the  efficient  operation of passenger  and  freight  transport 
services  and  to  ensure  transparency  in  their  finances,  including  aid  for 
restructuring, it is necessary to separate the accounts of passenger and of freight 
transport services, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 
Article 1 
Directive 911440/EEC is hereby amended as follows: 
1.  The second indent of  Article 1 is replaced by the following: 
"  by separating the management of infrastructure from the provision of railway 
transport  services,  the  separation  of both  profit  and  loss  accounts  and  of 
balance  sheets  and  the  award  to  an  independent  body  or  undertaking  of 
responsibility  for  those  functions  determinant  for  equitable  and  non-
discriminatory  access  to  infrastructure  being  compulsory,  and  the 
organisational or institutional separation of  other functions being optional," 
2.  The first and second indents of  Article 3 are replaced by the following: 
"  'railway  undertaking'  shall  mean any  private  or  public  undertaking  whose 
business  is  to  provide  rail  services  for  the  transport  of goods  and/or 
passengers with a requirement that the undertaking must ensure traction. 
'infrastructure manager' means any body or undertaking that is responsible for 
establishing and maintaining railway infrastructure." 
3.  Article 6(1) is replaced by the following: 
"1.  Member  States  shall  take  the  measures  necessary  to  ensure  that  separate 
profit and  loss  accounts and balance sheets are  kept  and  published,  on the 
one hand, for  business relating to the provision of transport services and,  on 
the other, for business relating to the management of railway infrastructure. 
Public funds paid to one of these two areas of activity may not be transferred 
to the other. 
The accounts for the two areas of activity shall be kept in a way that reflects 
this prohibition."  · 
4.  Article 7( 1  ), is amended as follows: 
(a)  Paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: 
"1.  Member States shall take the necessary measures for  the  development 
of their  national  railway  infrastructure  taking  into  account,  where 
necessary, the general needs ofthe Community. 
13 They shall ensure that safety standards and rules are laid down, applied 
and  enforced,  with  appropriate  monitoring.  This  shall  be  done  by 
bodies or  undertakings  that  do  not  provide  rail  transport  services 
themselves and are  independent of bodies or undertakings that do  so, 
in such a way as to  guarantee equitable and non-discriminatory access 
to infrastructure." 
(b)  The following paragraphs are added: 
"4.  Member  States  shall  take  the  measures  necessary  to  ensure  that 
infrastructure  managers  have  independent  status  as  regards 
management,  administration  and  internal .control  over administrative, 
economic and accounting matters. 
5.  Business plans shall be drawn up for infrastructure managers, including 
their  investment  and  financing  programmes.  Such  plans  shall  be 
designed  to  achieve their financial  balance and  to  ensure the optimal 
and  efficient  use  and  development of infrastructure;  they  must  also 
provide for the means enabling these objectives to be achieved. 
6.  In the context of the general policy guidelines determined by the State 
and  taking  into  account  national  plans  and  contracts  (which may  be 
multi-annual) including investment and financing plans, infrastructure 
managers shall, in particular, be free to: 
establish  their  internal  organisation,  without  prejudice  to  the 
provisions of  this Section; 
take decisions on staff and own procurement; 
manage their own assets as  efficiently as  possible, develop new 
technologies  and  new  services  and  adopt  any  innovative 
management techniques." 
5.  The following paragraph shall be added to Article 9: 
"4.  Separate  profit  and  loss  accounts  and  balance  sheets  shall  be  kept  and 
published,  respectively,  for  business relating to  the  provision of passenger 
transport  services  and  for  business  relating  to  the  provision  of 
freight transport services.  Funds paid to either of these two areas of activity 
shall be shown separately in the relevant accounts and shall not be transferred 
to the other." 
Article 2 
Member States shall adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary 
to comply with this Directive not later than one year following the date of  entry into force 
of  this Directive. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof. 
14 When  Member  States  adopt  those  provisions,  they  shall  contain  a  reference  to  this 
Directive  or  be  accompanied  by  such  reference  on  the  occasion  of their  official 
publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made. 
Article 3 
This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication 
in the Official Journal of  the European Communities. 
Article 4 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 
15 
For the Council 
The President Proposal for a 
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
amending Directive 95/18/EC on the licensing of 
railway undertakings 
16 . EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
1.  Following the first steps towards an integrated market for rail transport services by 
giving  access  and  transit  rights  to  railway  undertakings  and 
international groupings thereof by means of Article 10 of Directive 91/440/EEC1, 
two  additional  Directives,  95/18/EC2  and  95/19/ECJ  were  adopted  in  order  to 
ensure the  uniform  and  non-discriminatory application of the  rights  granted  by 
Directive 91/440/EEC. 
2.  Whilst  Directive  95/19/EC  set  broad  principles  for  the  allocation  of railway 
infrastructure  capacity and the  charging of fees  for  its  use,  Directive  95/18/EC 
introduced  a  licensing  scheme  for  railway  undertakings  offering  the  services 
referred  to  in  Article  10  of Directive  91/440/EEC4  but  not  for  other  railway 
undertakings.  Licences  awarded  in  accordance  with  Directive  95/18/EC  are 
obligatory  for  railway  undertakings  when  providing  these  services.  They  are 
granted by the Member State where a railway undertaking is  established but are 
valid throughout the Community. The main requirements for licence, as set by the 
Directive,  are  good  repute,  financial  fitness  and  professional  competence. 
Following  the  principle  of subsidiarity the  Directive  sets  broad  principles,  but 
leaves  the  Member  States  responsibility  for  setting  detailed  rules  and  for 
administering the system. 
3.  When restructuring the  railway sector,  some Member States  have created wider 
access rights to railway infrastructure than those of Directive 91 /440/EEC. Several 
Member States have established wider rights of access to the Trans-European Rail 
Freight Freeways. These developments are creating new opportunities for railway 
undertakings  established  in  the  Community;  indeed  any  such  undertaking  can 
enter these markets in advance of  Community legislation on market access. 
4.  Member States naturally intend to insist that railway undertakings seeking to enter 
these  markets  be  licensed,  in  order to  ensure  safe,  dependable  and  satisfactory 
services. It is a basic Community principle, however, that there be free circulation 
of services  and  undertakings  be  treated  fairly  and  without  discrimination.  A 
common  scheme  for  licences  would  allow  the  achievement  of  both  these 
objectives  and  would  prevent  licensing  becoming  a  barrier  to  entry.  How  to 
licence railway undertakings entering new markets is an issue that has been raised 
on various occasions, particularly in discussions on the Freight Freeways . 
2 
3 
4 
. 
Council  Directive  of 29  July  1991  on  the  development  of the  Community's  railways,  OJ  L 237, 
24.8.1991. 
Council  Directive of 19  June  1995  on  the  licensing of railway  undertakings,  OJ  L  143,  27.6.1995, 
p. 70. 
Council  Directive  of 19  June  1995  on  the  allocation  of railway  infrastructure  and  the  charging of 
infrastructure fees, OJ L 143, 27.6.1995. 
I.e.  railway  undertakings  operating  international  combined  transport  and  international  groupings  of 
railway undertakings. 
17 5.  The  Commission,  therefore,  proposes  to  extend  the  prov1s1ons  of 
Directive 95/18/EC  on  licensing  to  all  railway  undertakings  established  in  the 
Community, irrespective of whether they are providing the services mentioned in 
Article  10 of Directive 91/440/EC. This would allow all  railway undertakings to 
exploit possibilities to enter markets, on a uniform and non-discriminatory basis, 
and would prevent licensing requirements becoming a barrier to entry. 
6.  It  must  be  emphasised,  however,  that  this  amendment  of Directive  95/18/EC 
would not create new access or transit rights as such, and so would not change the 
scope of  Directive 91/440/EEC. 
18 Proposal for a 
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
amending Directive 95118/EC on the licensing of 
railway undertakings 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
98/0266 (SYN) 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community,  and  in  particular 
Article 75 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commissions, 
Having regard to the opinion of  the Economic and Social Committee6, 
Acting  in  accordance  with  the  procedure  laid  down  in  Article  189c  of the  Treaty  in 
cooperation with the European Parliament7, 
1.  Whereas  Council  Directive  91/440/EEC  of 29  July  1991  on the  development 
of  the  Community's railways8  provides for  certain access rights  in  international 
rail transport  for  railway  undertakings  and  international  groupings  of 
railway undertakings; 
2.  Whereas,  to  ensure  dependable  and  adequate  services,  a  common  licensing 
scheme  is  necessary  to  ensure  that  all  railway  undertakings  meet  at  any  time 
certain requirements in relation to good repute, financial fitness and professional 
competence  in  order  to  protect  customers  and  third  parties  and  offer  services 
observing a high standard of  safety; 
3.  Whereas, in order to ensure that access rights to railway infrastructure are applied 
throughout the  Community on a  uniform and non-discriminatory basis,  Council 
Directive 95/18/EC9  introduced a licence for  railway undertakings providing the 
services  referred  to  in  Article  10  of Directive  911440/EEC,  this  license  being 
obligatory for the operation of such services and valid throughout the Community; 
4.  Whereas,  since  some  Member  States  have  extended  access  rights  going 
beyond Directive 91/440/EEC  it  seems necessary to  ensure fair,  transparent and 
non-discriminatory treatment of all  railway undertakings that may operate in this 
market  by  extending  the  licensing  principles  laid  down  by the  Directive to  all 
companies active in the sector; 
5  OJC 
6  OJC 
7  OJC 
8  OJ  L 237, 24.8.1991, p.  25. 
9  OJ  L  143, 27.6.1995, p.  70 
19 5.  Whereas, in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as 
set out in  Article 3  b of the Treaty, the objectives of this Directive, namely to  set 
out  broad  principles  for  the  licensing  of railway  undertakings  and  the  mutual 
recognition of such  licences  throughout  the  Community,  cannot  be  sufficiently 
achieved  by  the  Member  States  on  account  of the  manifestly  international 
dimension of issuing such licences can therefore,  by  reason of its  trans-national 
implications,  be  better  achieved  by  the  Community;  whereas  this  Directive 
confines itself to the minimum required in order to  achieve those objectives and 
does not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose; 
6.  Whereas  it  should  be  specified  that  transport  activities  in  the  form  of shuttle 
services  for  road  vehicles  through  the  Channel  Tunnel  and  passenger  services 
solely operated on a local stand-alone network or by  using trams or light rail, are 
excluded  from  the  scope  of Directive  95/18/EC,  as  are  railway  undertakings 
solely carrying out their own freight operations on a network used exclusively for 
that purpose; 
7.  Whereas Community conditions for access to  or transit via railway infrastructure 
will be regulated by other provisions of Community law; 
8.  Whereas Directive 95/18/EC should be amended accordingly, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 
Article 1 
Directive 95/18/EC is amended as follows: 
1.  Article 1 is replaced by the following: 
"Article 1 
I.  This Directive concerns the criteria applicable to the issue, renewal or 
amendment  of  licences  by  a  Member  State  intended  for  railway 
undertakings which are or will be established in the Community. 
2.  Railway undertakings which operate passenger services on local stand-
alone  networks  or  urban  or  suburban  passenger  services  using,  for 
example,  trams  or  light  rail  are  excluded  from  the  scope  of this 
Directive.  Railway  undertakings  carrying  out  their  own  freight 
operations on a network used exclusively for that purpose are excluded 
from the scope ofthis Directive. 
3.  Railway undertakings and international groupings the activity of which 
is  limited to the provision of shuttle services transporting road vehicles 
through  the  Channel  Tunnel  shall  be  excluded  from  the  scope  of 
this Directive. 
4.  A licence shall be valid throughout the territory of  the Community." 
20 2.  Article 2 is amended as follows: 
(a)  Point (a) is replaced by the following: 
"(a)  'railway undertaking' means any public or private undertaking the 
business of which is to  provide rail  services for  the transport of 
goods and/or passengers with a requirement that the undertaking 
must ensure traction;" 
(b)  Point (d) is deleted. 
3.  Article 3 is replaced by the following: 
"Article 3 
Each Member State shall designate the body responsible for issuing licences and 
for  carrying  out the  obligations  imposed by  this  Directive.  The  task of issuing 
license  shall  be  carried  out  by  a  body  which  does  not  provide  rail  transport 
services itself and is independent of  bodies or undertakings that do so." 
Article 2 
Member States shall adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary 
to  comply with this Directive no later than one year following the date of its entry into 
force. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof. 
When  Member  States  adopt  those  provisions,  they  shall  contain  a  reference  to  this 
Directive  or  be  accompanied  by  such  reference  on  the  occasion  of their  official 
publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made. 
Article 3 
This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication 
in the Official Journal of  the European Communities. 
Article 4 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 
21 
For the Council 
The President Proposal for a 
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
relating to the allocation of  railway infrastructure capacity 
and the levying of  charges for the use of  railway infrastructure 
and safety certification 
22 EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
Section 1 - Introduction 
I.  The  Commission's  railway  policy  fits  under  the  umbrella  of  the 
Common Transport Policy and there are a number of high level objectives that it 
seeks  to  work  towards.  These  are  the  development  of  the  single  market, 
sustainable mobility, the promotion of efficiency in the transport system and the 
promotion of freight  traffic  by  rail.  This  proposal  aims  to  ensure  that  railway 
infrastructure charges and capacity allocation procedures contribute to  achieving 
these objectives. 
2.  It is a fundamental Treaty objective to ensure the completion of the single market 
throughout the Community.  Through developing better and  cheaper services, in 
particular for traffic between the Member States, rail can assist the development of 
the  single  market  and  the  further  integration  of national  economies.  However, 
among the transport modes, rail stands out as the one where least progress has so 
far·been made in creating the conditions where undertakings are free to establish 
operations and offer services in any Member State.  To achieve this requires the 
establishment of appropriate  access  rights  and  necessary  framework  conditions 
that include appropriate level and structure of infrastructure charges. 
3.  The Commission's White Paper on the Common Transport Policy1 notes the need 
for transport policies to contribute to the pursuit of sustainable mobility. Different 
modes  of transport  have  different  roles  to  play  in  meeting  the  Community's 
transport needs, but it is important to ensure that sensible and efficient choices are 
made.  Different  systems  of charging  between  transport  modes  or  on  different 
networks can have a negative influence on the appropriate distribution of  demand. 
Further distortion to  the demand for transport as  well as  the relative demand for 
different transport modes will arise as a result of the lack of charges reflecting the 
external costs of  transport. 
4.  The  promotion  of  efficiency  within  the  transport  system  means  ensuring 
that appropriate  modal  choices  are  made  as  well  as  ensuring  that  mechanisms 
encourage  efficient  choices  within  modes.  Progress  towards  efficient  modal 
choice can  be  made  through  ensuring  that  at  point  of use,  transport  users  are 
confronted with the full  additional cost (the marginal cost) which their transport 
imposes on society. 
5.  In  paragraph  103,  the  Common  Transport  Policy  White  Paper  states  that 
'·Measures affecting the  charged  costs of transport  have  a  direct  impact on the 
competitive position of transport systems and operators. It  is  difficult for national 
or local authorities to  act alone if by doing so  they will prejudice the position of 
their enterprises relative to those from other regions. For this reason, measures of 
this kind are best taken within a framework decided at Community level." Without 
a coordinated approach, lowering charges on one section of an international route 
may simply permit the tariffs to  be  increased on a different part of infrastructure. 
The future development of the common transport policy, COM(92) 494 final. 
23 6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
2 
These interactions point to the desirability of a framework within which charges 
should be set which will ensure equity and achieve desirable policy aims. 
Railways must play a key role if the Commission's objective of moving toward 
sustainable mobility is to be realised, and if  some of the goods and passengers that 
might travel  by road will  instead travel  by  rail.  Action is  required  against the 
background where, within the  15  Member States of the  EU between  1990 and 
1995, rail transport has continued to see a decline in its market share from 18.8% 
to some 14.4% of  freight tonne-km and from 6.8% to some 6.0% ofpassenger-km. 
Rail  should be particularly attractive  as a  means  of moving large quantities of 
freight  over  long  distances.  However,  in  Europe  rail  has  so  far  been  fairly 
unsuccessful in retaining and developing this market. This sector of the transport 
market is of importance to the development of the single market and is likely to 
become increasingly crucial. In Europe a long distance rail journey will frequently 
mean that capacity must be granted and charges levied for the use of more than 
one  infrastructure  network.  These  factors  create  an  additional  barrier  to 
international rail traffic . 
. Purchasers of  transport services base their decisions on a number of  factors. While 
the  quality of service  and  reliability  are  likely  to  be  of major importance,  the 
weighting of  the different factors will be influenced by a number of considerations 
and the price of  the final service will also be a major factor in transport decisions. 
The level of charges, which have to be paid for the use of infrastructure, will in 
itself have a significant influence on the final cost of the service. The impact will 
differ  between  different  transport  modes  since  infrastructure  costs  vary  as  a 
proportion of total  service  cost.  In  the  case  of rail,  the  cost  of provision  of 
infrastructure tends to  be high while the marginal costs of its use are generally 
low.  Infrastructure costs comprise a substantial  proportion of total railway cost 
and therefore can have a significant effect on its relative attractiveness. It is vital 
that these factors are taken account of in charging systems if they are to enable rail 
services to be competitive. 
Council Directive 911440/EEC2  on the development of the Community railways 
created certain access rights for railway undertakings to the railway infrastructures 
of  the Community. In particular Article 10 provides that international groupings of 
railway undertakings are permitted access to provide international passenger and 
freight services and there is a right of access for combined transport services to 
perform international movements. These access rights resulted in two fundamental 
changes to the pre-existing situation. First, they began a process of separation of 
railway  infrastructure  management  from  the  operation  of trains.  Second,  they 
established the possibility of there being multiple users of an individual railway 
infrastructure. It was recognised that these rights would in themselves have little 
effect  unless  they  were  accompanied  by  a  legislative  framework  governing 
access conditions. 
Council Directive of29 July 199, OJ L 237, 24.8.1991, p. 25. 
24 10.  Subsequently in 1995, the Council adopted Directives 95/18/ECJ dealing with the 
licensing  of railway  undertakings  and  95/19/EC4  on  the  allocation  of railway 
capacity  and  the  charging  of infrastructure  fees  for  services  operated  under 
Article 10 of Directive 91/440/EEC. Neither Directive 95/19/EC nor this proposal 
to  amend  it  concerns  access  rights.  Those  rights  of access  are  determined  by 
Directive 911440/EEC and by any national legislation which creates greater rights 
of access.  Directive  95/19/EC  and  this  proposal  are  intended  to  ensure  that 
within the  access  rights  existing,  the  allocation of capacity  is  performed  in  an 
appropriate manner. 
11.  In addition to the Community legal framework, the railway industry has seen the 
beginnings of changes in its structure. In some Member States there are a number 
of private sector railway  undertakings operating passenger and  freight  services. 
Some Member States allow or require competitive tendering for services operated 
under  contract  to  public  authorities;  these  contracts  may  be  won  by  private 
companies. Nonetheless, despite these developments it  remains the case that,  in 
most Member States the traditional incumbent railway undertaking still dominates 
the other undertakings. 
12.  The Commission's Railway White Papers set out a strategy for enabling progress 
toward  a  revitalised  Community  railway  which  will  in  tum  ensure  progress 
towards  its  high  level  goals.  The  White  Paper sought to  build  on  the  existing 
Community  legal  framework  and  proposed  further  measures  to  develop  the 
market. Two of  the measures which it identified were the need for further action in 
the areas of railway  infrastructure capacity allocation and  railway  infrastructure 
charges  (paragraphs  48-55).  As  foreseen  in  the  White  Paper,  the  Commission 
has recently  published  a  communication6  which  reviews  the  impact  of 
Directive 911440/EEC.  This notes the  need  for  further definition of Community 
rules for infrastructure charges and capacity allocation. 
13. 
14. 
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In their opinion7 on the White Paper, the European Parliament noted the need for 
further  elaboration  of the  framework  for  access  to  railway  infrastructure.  The 
Economic and  Social  Committee noted in  their report on  the  White  Paper that 
"Infrastructure charges and timetable priorities are further points which need  to 
be discussed  ... " s. 
The Commission's White Paper "Fair Payment for  Infrastructure use"9  proposes 
that  the  "users  pay"  principle  should  underpin  the  development  of charging 
systems in all commercial modes of transport. The long term objective is to align 
charges with "marginal social costs", i.e.  those costs that are imposed at the point 
of use,  including environmental and other "external" impacts.  The  White Paper 
Council Directive of 19 June 1995, OJ L 143, 27.6.1995, p. 70. 
Council Directive of 19 June 1995, OJ L 143, 27.6.1995, p. 75 . 
A strategy for revitalising the Community's railways, COM(96) 421  fmal 
Communication on the implementation and impact of  Directive 91 /440/EEC on the development of  the 
Community's railways and on access rights for rail freight, COM(  1998) 202 final. 
A4 - 0412/97 of 13 January 1998, OJ C 34, 2.2.1998. 
CES 459/97. 
Fair payment for infrastructure use: A phased approach to a common transport infrastructure charging 
framework in the EU, COM( 1998) 466 final. 
25 recognises that, given the different starting points, a gradual approach, comprising 
three phases is required. The framework proposed for rail infrastructure charging 
in  this  Communication should  be  seen  as  covering the  first  two phases of the 
proposes approach as far as railways are concerned. 
15.  There are a number of links between the allocation of capacity and the levying of 
infrastructure charges.  The level of charges will  influence demand, this in tum 
has an impact on the ease with which requests for capacity may be satisfied. This 
mechanism may  be  used  specifically to  allocate capacity through an auctioning 
mechanism or through  scarcity  charge  which reflect  the  value  of the  capacity. 
These mechanisms can ensure that users, who value the.capacity most highly, will 
benefit from the use of it.  Charges may be levied for booking capacity to provide 
assurance that the capacity will be used.  Economic incentives to operate services 
as planned can improve the performance of the system and provide an increase in 
available  capacity.  Some  functions,  in  particular  that  of regulation  or  hearing 
appeals for both activities, could probably be best undertaken by the same body. 
To ensure that these links are  not lost sight of the two issues are tackled in one 
proposal as they were in Directive 95/19/EC. 
16.  It is therefore clear that both capacity allocation procedures and charging schemes 
will have a significant role in the further development of  the rail transport market. 
Without Community action in these areas, rail is likely to remain disadvantaged by 
its  structure  and  fail  to  deliver  its  full  potential.  At  the  same  time  this  action 
should  also  be  directed  at  encouraging  the  more  efficient  use  of railway 
infrastructure both in terms of  access for different traffic types and also in terms of 
overall utilisation levels. 
1.2.  Section 2 - Current situation in railway infrastructure charging 
17.  The Community has for a long time taken an interest in charges for transport use, 
and there are a number of pieces of legislation on this matter.  Regulation (EEC) 
No  1108/701° set out an accounting system for expenditure on infrastructure for 
land transport and required submission of accounts to the Commission each year. 
Regulation (EEC) No 2598/7011  specified the items for inclusion in the accounts 
required  by  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1108/70.  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1384/7912 
amended Regulation (EEC) No  11 08170  by relaxing the reporting requirement to 
once every five  years  for  smaller railways  as  well·as making some other small 
amendments.  Regulation  (EEC)  No  28301771 3  sets  out  requirements  for  the 
establishment  of  comparable  accounts  by  railway  undertakings,  while 
Regulation (EEC) No  21831781 4 lays down uniform costing principles relating to 
freight transport. 
18.  The implementation of Directive 95/19/EC in the Member States has resulted in 
quite  disparate  infrastructure  charging  schemes.  Current  railway  infrastructure 
charging  schemes  differ  tremendously.  The  overall  level  of recovery  of rail 
1°  Council Regulation (EEC) No 1108/70 of  4 June 1970, OJ L 130,  15.6.1970~P· 4. 
II  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2598/70 of 18 December 1970, OJ L 278, 23.121970, p.  1. 
12  Council Regulation (EEC) No 1384/79 of25 June 1979, OJ L 167, 5.7.1979. 
13  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2830/77 of 12 December 1977, OJ L 334, 24.12.1977. 
14  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2183/78 of 19 September 1978, OJ L 258, 21.9.1978. 
26 infrastructure costs varies from zero in some Member States whereas others aim, 
at least in principle, to recover 1  00% of  the costs. The structure also varies widely 
from negotiated charges via formulae to fixed tariffs, some using multi-part tariffs. 
There is in addition no uniformity about what services are provided for the charge 
being levied or what parameters are to be taken into account in setting charges. 
An overview of different charging systems in the  Member States is  provided in 
the Annex. 
19.  As explained in the White Paper "Fair Payment for Infrastructure use", to provide 
price signals for the optimal use of infrastructure, the charges should be set at the 
level corresponding to the additional cost imposed on society by the service. In the 
absence of  charges covering external costs in all modes of transport and given the 
relatively low levels of rail traffic resulting from lack of customer orientation and 
high cost in rail, such charges would currently only represent a proportion of the 
overall  level  of the  cost  of provision  of the  rail  infrastructure.  At  present  an 
optimal  charging  system  would,  therefore,  result  in  under  recovery  of rail 
infrastructure  costs  and  the  only  means  of continuing  the  operation  of the 
infrastructure would be by the provision of support from elsewhere, traditionally 
from central government. It has to be pointed out, however, that all rail charging 
systems currently in place require significant direct or indirect government support 
for rail infrastructure managers. 
20.  A  variety  of mechanisms  exist  for  recovering  a  greater  proportion  of the 
infrastructure costs but these are likely to give rise to varying levels of distortion 
to patterns of  use. Such mechanisms are based on principles such as the use of  two 
part tariffs1s, Ramsey pricing16  or annual rolling stock charges. So far the impact 
of some of the inefficiencies caused by the application of these mechanisms may 
have been limited, since price signals and incentives may only have a small impact 
on behaviour in industries with extensive public ownership and significant barriers 
to  entry.  It is  important that charging mechanisms  do  not prevent traffic  from 
using  rail  infrastructure  when  it  is  able  to  pay  the  additional  costs  which  it 
imposes  even  if that  contribution  is  only  small.  Some  current  practices,  if 
continued, will lead to price sensitive services being priced off the rail  network 
unnecessarily, as well as competition being frustrated by charging structures. 
21.  It is clear from discussions with railway undertakings that the current situation is a 
deterrent to the development of international services, because of the complexity 
of establishing the overall level of infrastructure charges but also because of the 
different price signals which are sent by the various schemes. In  its report on the 
Commission's Railway White Paper the European Parliament notes the problem 
of differing  charging systems  for  rail  infrastructure  and  took the  view that  the 
Commission should submit proposals on the criteria to be taken into account in 
calculating the cost of railway infrastructure. In addition the Economic and Social 
Committee has identified the present systems of infrastructure charges as being a 
very serious problem and urged the Commission to give the highest priority to this 
area of  work. 
15  This  means  the  use of a fixed  tariff to  recover a proportion of the  fixed  costs and  a variable  charge 
which relates to the amount of use made of the infrastructure. 
16  This involves the use ofmark ups which vary inversely with the elasticity of  demand. 
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For  freight  traffic  the  impact  of these  different  charging  mechanisms  can  be 
particularly  problematic.  Moving  freight  by  rail  should  become  increasingly 
attractive as distances  increase~ In Europe, long distances will frequently mean a 
journey which crosses more than one railway infrastructure network. Rail freight 
is almost always in very strong competition with road haulage and in many cases 
also  exposed to  competition  from  inland  waterway and  short  sea  shipping.  In 
comparison with these other modes, a high proportion of the cost of rail arises 
from its infrastructure, which means that the type of charging scheme can have a 
correspondingly high effect on its competitiveness. This is further re-inforced by 
the fact that road freight currently pays relatively low infrastructure charges on a 
marginal basis and is  not charged at the point of use for the high external costs it 
generates.  It  also  needs  to  be  possible  for  railway  undertakings  to  quickly 
determine the level of  charges they will have to pay if  they are to be able to rapidly 
bid  for  freight  traffic  in  competition  with  road  services.  This  problem  is 
exacerbated  where  a  service  will  cross  more  than  one  infrastructure  network. 
Finally  if charging  schemes  in  different  Member  States  are  designed  to  send 
different signals to users, this could produce a confusing situation for operators of 
long distance services who are unable to respond to the different signals. 
It can therefore be concluded that there is a pressing need to make progress on the 
harmonisation  of infrastructure  charge  structures  for  international  rail  freight 
services.  The  main  reasons  can  be  summarised  as  the  different  objectives  of 
Infrastructure Managers, the resufting different charging systems which have the 
potential  for  discrimination,  varying  service  packages,  the  use  of different 
parameters  for  varying  charges, the  failure  to  recognise  international  freight  as 
operating in a different market and ensure its competitiveness at an international 
level and finally the impossibility of producing a price rapidly as a result of the 
above factors. 
A further issue is that the market for the supply of railway infrastructure is by its 
nature essentially monopolistic. This implies a considerable need to  control the 
behaviour of the  Infrastructure  Manager to  ensure  that  he  does  not abuse  that 
position.  In  particular  limits  might  be  needed  where  he  varies  access  charges 
between  traffic  types  and  might  levy  excessive  charges  particularly  for  traffic 
which is to a high degree dependent on using rail. It is equally important to ensure 
that  the  Infrastructure  Manager  is  provided  with. the  necessary  incentives  to 
improve  his  efficiency and thus  lower costs  and  charges and  improve  net~ork 
performance as well as to make investments where these are necessary. 
There has been much interest in the issues raised, both historically and in the light 
of recent developments in the rail sector within the Community. In recognition of 
the problems and the need for action, the International Railway Union (UIC) has 
independently undertaken a number of studies on railway infrastructure charges. 
Of particular interest are the study on allocatively efficient pricing mechanisms17 
and a  further  report entitled Peage  III 8  which was intended to  identify areas of 
potential harmonisation for railway infrastructure charges.  The Commission has 
been kept  informed of progress on this  work and  has  taken due account of its 
Infrastructure  cost  recovery  under  allocatively  efficient  pricing  UIC/CER  study  by  Dr  Rana  Roy, 
March  1988. 
18  UIC  Le Peage study- Coopers and Lybrand report for UIC April  1998. 
28 results.  The  European  Conference of Ministers of Transport  (ECMT)  has  also 
recently  held  a  round  table  on  "user  charges  for  railway  infrastructure"  and 
published a report t9. 
26.  Following  the  publication  of its  Railway  White  Paper,  the  Commission  has 
undertaken a study2°  including a review of the principles and  issues  associated 
with charging for railway infrastructure use as well as the systems currently in use 
within the Community. This study has been closely monitored and directed by a 
committee of representatives of the  Member States  assisted  by  observers  from 
interested organisations2t and representatives of  small railway undertakings. 
Nature of  problems to be addressed 
27.  Discussion of railway  infrastructure charges can be  complex  on  account of the 
many different objectives which charging schemes can seek to achieve. Frequently 
those different objectives will result in conflicting requirements from the charging 
system. While there are many possible objectives for a rail infrastructure charging 
system, the broad aims can be characterised as ensuring efficient use and provision 
of rail  infrastructure,  efficiency  in  other  parts  of the  rail  industry  and  the 
promotion of  economic and social policy objectives. 
The price for efficient use 
28.  As the Commission's White Paper "Fair Payment for Infrastructure use" indicates, 
the efficient price to be charged for infrastructure use to  be optimal will be equal 
to the additional cost imposed on society by the operation of an additional service. 
This is  referred  to  as  the  short  run  marginal  cost  (SRMC).  This  position  was 
backed  by  the  ECMT  round  table  whose  report  states  that  "The  fundamental 
principle is that a system of user charges should relate the running of additional 
trains  to  the  additional  cost  that  running  those  trains  entails".  For  a  service 
operating on  rail  infrastructure without capacity shortages these costs  will  arise 
from factors such as: 
•  track wear and tear; 
•  traction current used; 
•  increased signal operations costs; 
•  train planning costs; 
•  additional management and administration costs; 
•  scarcity and congestion costs; 
•  noise, pollution and other external effects. 
29.  In reality  the  charging  scheme  for  railway  infrastructure  must  take  account  of 
charges levied for  the  provision of other transport services which compete  with 
(or are complementary to) rail  services.  For railways a particular problem is the 
pricing of road  services,  since  road  users  are  charged  directly  for  only a small 
19  CEMT/CSIRE(98) 3  Committee  of  Deputies,  Economic  Research  Committee,  Conclusions  of 
Round Table 110, User Charges for Railway Infrastructure. 
20  An  examination  of rail  infrastructure  charges  - report  for  the  European Commission  May  1998  -
NERA. 
21  CER, UIC, ESC, UIRR, Joint Committee 
29 proportion of  the costs generated by their use of  road infrastructure. This issue was 
discussed in the Green Paper "Towards Fair and Efficient Pricing in Transport" 
and in the White Paper "Fair Payment for  Infrastructure use". The White paper 
concludes that the most desirable and efficient situation is for all transport users to 
pay the cost which they impose on society at the ppint of use. Nevertheless, until 
there  is  a  willingness  to  achieve  this,  a  second  best  solution  is  to  provide 
compensation to  transport  users  generating  relatively  low costs  to  reduce  their 
charges.  Until  charging  for  external  effects  is  implemented  in  all  modes  of 
transport,  this  situation justifies  the  implementation  of compensation  scheme 
resulting in lower charges for access to rail infrastructure. Nevertheless, any such 
scheme would require solid justification for the proposed levels of  compensation. 
Other Objectives 
30.  While  pricing  based  on  additional  cost  may  be  the  most  appropriate  way  of 
ensuring  optimum  use  of infrastructure,  it  does  have  limitations.  It can  be 
criticised for  focusing only on rail  infrastructure (and not other parts of the rail 
industry, transport sector or economy as a whole) and then only at a single point in 
time.  In  practice, the  price mechanism  is  often also expected to achieve  other 
· important objectives in addition  to promoting efficient immediate consumption 
and  production decisions.  In  particular  it  is  important to ensure that there  are 
incentives  to  attract  traffic  which  makes  economic  sense,  to  expand  capacity 
where needed, and to increase efficiency, both of train operations but also of the 
infrastructure manager. 
Economic and social policy objectives 
31.  The  importance  of  railways  to  economic  and  social  activity  means  that 
governments often have specific objectives which may mean that they wish to see 
a  departure  from  commercial  pricing  and  decision-making.  It  is  established 
Community policy that there should be managerial independence of railways and 
that over time the accounts of infrastructure managers should balance. To enable 
this  to  be  reconciled  with  such  other  Government  objectives  may  require  the 
provision of  substantial state contributions. 
32.  For example, Member States may wish, for regional policy reasons, to ensure that 
railway services are provided to rural  or isolated locations. It is unreasonable to 
place the burden for the provision of these services on the infrastructure manager, 
and  in  this  case  government  must  purchase  the  supply of the  railway  service 
including the appropriate level of  infrastructure charges at an appropriate price. 
Need  for harmonisation measures 
3  3.  From a point of  view of  transport efficiency at the European level it is desirable to 
ensure that railway infrastructure charging schemes employ the same principles. 
This will facilitate journeys crossing "more than one network, send clear signals to 
users and ensure that where competing infrastructures exist, sensible choices are 
made between them. 
30 Section 3 - Current situation in capacity allocation 
34.  Directive 95/19/EC  established a broad framework  at Community level  for  the 
allocation of railway infrastructure capacity for the provision of services operated 
under  Article  10  of  Directive  91/440/EEC.  Since  the  implementation  of 
Directive 911440/EEC, the international capacity allocation process has also been 
modified under Forum Train Europe- an organisation set up by a large number of 
European  railway  companies  - to  take  account  of the  changes  created  by  that 
Directive  and  in  particular  a  number  of points  are  synchronised  through  the 
Forum Train Europe process. The actual practical procedures for establishing the 
timetable  are  frequently  carried  out  in  practice  in  a  similar  method  in  most 
Member States. 
35.  The different capacity-allocation schemes currently in use  in the Member States 
and  the  role  of Forum  Train  Europe  were  assessed  in  the  course  of a  study22 
carried out on behalf of the Commission. This study which was accompanied by 
a committee  of experts  from  the  Member  States  and  the  industry  concerned 
(CER, UIC,  ESC,  UIRR,  joint  committee  and  small  railway  undertakings) 
highlighted  differences  between  the  allocation  processes  and  the  timing of the 
different steps for the  regular timetable between Member States. The study final 
report aims to draw together best practice and to put forward proposals for further 
development of allocation processes which will  assist in relieving the problems 
which have been identified by the various participants in the process. 
36.  As the market for railway services has begun to  evolve, it has become clear that 
the existing arrangements do not satisfy many of the needs which exist. There are 
frequent complaints that allocation processes fail to place appropriate value on the 
needs  of specific  traffic  types,  that  processes  are  biased,  that  information  is 
misused and that the whole process is too slow and unwieldy.  While efforts are 
undoubtedly being made to improve this situation at national levd, it is clear that 
many of these  concerns  also  affect  markets  at  Community level,  and  therefore 
require a Community legislative framework. 
37.  The capacity allocation process cannot be  viewed  as  an  isolated process.  It fits 
within  a  larger  framework  running  from  long  term  infrastructure  development 
through access control, and the scheduling process down to train control.  It also 
has links with other aspects of the management of railway infrastructure such as 
the  scheme  for  infrastructure  charges.  These  factors  all  affect  the  allocation 
process on one network, but difficult questions also arise about ensuring adequate 
collaboration  between  allocation  processes  to  enable  operation  of  services 
between networks. 
38.  It  is clear that the current situation is far from  ideal, and appears in particular to 
hamper - international services, the development of  the rail market and the growth 
of rail  freight.  To  a large degree, these difficulties are  linked with the  fact  that 
many of  the decisions which must be taken are a matter of  judgement and balance, 
rather than having any clear right answer.  These point to  a need to address the 
processes to  be  followed  rather than the  development of rigid rules  leaving the 
details to be addressed at Member State level. 
22  Coopers and Lybrand, Examination ofTrain Path Allocation, May  1998. 
31 Commission Objectives 
39.  The main objectives of the Commission in tabling this proposal are therefore to 
seek to ensure fairness and efficiency in allocation processes, notably with regards 
to  international  train  paths,  and  to  enhance  colla~oration for  the  allocation  of 
capacity across more than one network.  Seeking to  ensure fairness  in  arriving at 
allocation decisions will involve ensuring a better balance between the needs of 
different users of the network, in particular recognising. the specific requirements 
of freight  transport,  as  well  as  addressing  the  different  needs  of users  and  the 
infrastructure manager. Promoting efficiency in the allocation process will involve 
streamlining the process, making better use of capacity, and ensuring that capacity 
constraints are addressed. Enhancing collaboration between allocation bodies for 
different networks will involve addressing how this  should take  place, and  also 
what redress is required when things go wrong. 
Nature of specific problems to be addressed 
Equality of  treatment 
40.  ·It is  clear  that  all  applicants  for  capacity  must  be  treated  in  a  fair  and  non-
discriminatory manner yet schemes frequently fail  to provide adequate assurance 
of this to  applicants for capacity.  These concerns extend beyond fairness to  also 
concern the treatment of commercially sensitive information during the process. 
As with any activity where one body is determining the conditions and ability of 
otker undertakings to access a market, it is  important that there is no  possibility 
of  one of the market players being in  a position to  unfairly influence decisions. 
These  factors  point  to  the  need  for  greater  clarity  in  the  relationships 
between railway undertakings, the infrastructure manager and the performance of 
capacity allocation  . 
• 
41.  All parties have, for different reasons an interest in the  good performance of the 
allocation process, undertakings want to know that their needs are given adequate 
weight  while  infrastructure  managers  need  to  be  sure  that  they  are  obtaining 
optimal  use  of the  infrastructure.  This  is  likely  to  be  of most  concern  for 
undertakings  that  are  not  dominant  in  the  market,  but  as  the  trend  to  a  more 
effective separation between infrastructure management and railway undertakings 
continues, even the larger undertakings are likely to require assurance. 
42.  All requests for capacity shall be accorded equal priority in their treatment by the 
allocation body. This is clearly essential to ensure that different applicants receive 
non-discriminatory treatment. It is also desirable from the point of view of making 
optimal  use  of the  rail  network.  If the  allocation  process  is  approached  by 
determining a number of priority services which cannot then be moved or altered 
in any way then this places immediate constraints on the availability of capacity 
for  other services.  This limits the utilisation of the  infrastructure as well  as the 
availability of  train paths which adequately meet the needs of  other services. 
43.  It is therefore desirable that the allocation body should commence its task with a 
clear  understanding  of all  of the  requests  which  have  been  submitted  and  the 
commercial  needs  of those  requests.  Its  task  is  then  to  ensure  the  optimum 
outcome which ensures that to the greatest degree it can satisfy those requests in 
an  acceptable  manner.  It  must  only  be  the  case  that  when  it  is  unable  to 
32 satisfactorily meet all of  the requests that it can then apply the previously specified 
priority rules to determine which requests will be rejected. 
44.  The  allocation  body  must  ensure  that  information  it  gathers  about  operations 
remains  confidential  since  this  type  of information  could  be  of considerable 
interest  to  other  undertakings.  At  the  end  of the  allocation  process,  each 
undertaking should feel  confident that his bid has been treated according to  the 
rules set out and that it has been treated with equal priority to comparable requests 
from  other undertakings.  Where this is  not the case he must have  the  ability to 
launch an appeal. 
Transparency 
45.  For  an  integrated  railway  without  competitors,  decisions  on  the  allocation  of 
capacity  are  essentially  administrative.  There  is  no  question  of discrimination 
since  all  participants  are  employed  by  the  same  company.  Such  a  situation 
removes  one  complexity  but  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the  results  of the 
process  are  in  any  way  optimum.  It  could  be  that  administrative  rules  are 
developed to facilitate the performance of the allocation task but which do not in 
fact reflect the reality of  the markets in which the different services are required to 
operate.  In  some cases this could arise as  a result of changes in  markets which 
have not been reflected in the way the allocation process is performed. It is useful 
even  where  only  one  railway  undertaking  organises  railway  services  for  the 
choices which are made between different services and types of traffic to be made 
explicit rather than hidden. To overcome these problems implies a clear need for 
the rules governing the process to  be  established after discussion with users and 
then made available to all applicants in advance of  the process. 
Requirements of  different traffic types 
46.  It  is vital in establishing the allocation scheme and during the allocation process, 
that  adequate  account  is  taken  of the  requirements  of different  traffic  types. 
Different  users  of the  rail  network  will  have  different  and  often  conflicting 
requirements.  It  is  not  possible to  satisfactorily anticipate these  since  they  will 
vary between undertakings and between the individual traffic flows performed by 
those undertakings. A distinction can be drawn between the commercial needs of 
an  applicant  within  a  timetable  period,  and  the  need  for  continuity  between 
timetable periods. 
47.  Constraints related to  capacity allocation can arise from  many  different  factors. 
Between different types of rolling stock there is  a wide  spectrum of top speed, 
deceleration  and  acceleration  characteristics.  Different  services  have  different 
stopping  patterns  and  therefore  require  access  to  facilities  which  may  not  be 
required by other services operating on the same route. Very different needs arise 
for freight and passenger services. 
48.  In general it is clear that most passenger services, especially those serving a local 
or  regional  market  are  likely  to  desire  stable  timetables  which  are  known  in 
advance  with  a  gradual  evolution  to  reflect  changing  demand  or  service 
enhancement.  They  will  wish  to  provide  for  appropriate  interchanges,  with 
services  at  suitable  intervals  to  meet  customer  needs  and  allow  business 
33 development.  These  needs  will  differ  between  long  distance  services  and 
local services. 
49.  For freight  services,  in  general  the  time  at  points en route  is  likely  to  be  less 
crucial  than  originating,  arriving  or  total  journey  time.  In  addition,  a  large 
proportion of  the potential freight market may only be available to rail if it is able 
to provide services quickly in response to demand, whether those are occasional or 
regular. Freight services may often need flexibility to alter operations to fit in with 
other aspects of  the logistic chain. Nevertheless, once services are established they 
may also have a legitimate interest in retaining aspects of the operation between 
timetable periods. 
50.  When coordination is required it will be necessary as part of that process to take 
account of the needs of the different services. The implications for modifications 
to requests must be taken into account on the running of the services both within 
the immediate vicinity but also over the whole length of their journey. It will also 
be necessary to take account of the effect of the modification on the business of 
the applicant who is affected. In view of these factors the process must be carried 
out transparently and in consultation with the railway undertakings involved. 
Balance between freight and  passenger 
51.  Until there is a fuller reflection through charges of the external costs associated 
with different transport modes, it seems likely that long distance passenger traffic 
is  likely  to  remain  constrained  to  distances  where  journey  times  are  not 
significantly greater than the comparable time to travel by air. However, freight is 
not so constrained and in fact  long distance and international freight services are 
likely to be  one of the areas  where rail  has significant opportunities to  increase 
market share.  However, the operation of these types of services faces  numerous 
difficulties. 
52.  Freight has traditionally been accorded fairly low priority on the rail network.  In 
part this may be a reflection of the past market where rail tended to carry mostly 
low value bulk commodities such as coal, steel and  grain where journey speeds 
were less crucial. If rail is to succeed in expanding market share then it is likely to 
need to increase its share of higher value more time sensitive goods. In theory rail 
should  be  ideal  for  such  movements  since  it  offers  the  potential  for  secure 
transport without congestion and thus guaranteed journey times. 
53.  Traditionally the timetabling process has been geared around passenger services, 
however,· the  changing  needs  of the  freight  market  imply  that  the  methods of 
allocating capacity must begin to take greater account of  the needs of  freight.  The 
time  frame  for  requests  can  be  very  different  with  scheduled passenger needs 
identified  many  months  prior  to  finalisation  of the  timetable  whereas  freight 
request could vary even up  to  the point of departure of the train if that could be 
accommodated. In view of this it is desirable that infrastructure manager's should 
attempt to  reduce  the  lead-time  for  preparation of timetables which will  retain 
flexibility  till  later  in  the  process.  In  addition  increased  use  of Information 
Technology will enable later adjustment. Clearly there are constraints such as the 
lead-time  for  planning  passenger  services  and  the  need  for  timetables  to  be 
published and distributed and this will place limits on the time at which the final 
timetable can be published. It is important that infrastructure managers should pay 
34 regard to the needs of  traffic which requires capacity at short notice when they are 
allocating capacity for regular services. 
Services operated under contract to public authorities 
54.  Public  passenger transport plays  a vital  role  in  reducing environmental damage 
and  promoting social cohesion.  In  view of this,  society often requires  a higher 
level of public transport service by road or rail than purely commercial decisions, 
by  operators,  would  provide.  These  services  are  known  as  public  services.  In 
the past,  public  authorities  secured  public  services  by  imposing  public  service 
obligations  on  operators.  Community  law23  now  requires  that  publicly  funded 
transport  services  should  be  clearly  defined  in  public  service  contracts  and 
the operators  of these  services  should  be  properly  compensated.  However, 
Member States can exempt operators providing only local and regional passenger 
transport from these requirements. 
55.  To secure service integration, it is often appropriate for operators of passenger rail 
services  to  be  awarded  an  exclusive  right  to  operate  defined  types  of services 
within a defined geographical area.  There  is  no  comprehensive requirement for 
public authorities to bring market forces  to  bear in  awarding exclusive rights or 
public service contracts, but this is now the practice in  an increasing number of 
Member States, particularly in relation to the tendering of multi-year contracts to 
provide rail services within regions. This development is welcome as a means of 
providing incentives for efficient and effective services. 
56.  There is a linkage between the capacity allocation process and the ability of local 
authorities to purchase services which are operated under contract to them. Where 
railway undertakings are subject to  a public service obligation or public service 
contract requiring them to  provide a service, then the capacity allocation scheme 
must enable them to fulfil their obligations. Where public authorities are preparing 
to tender a public service contract, the capacity allocation scheme needs to allow 
them to  define - within acceptable parameters - the nature of the  capacity that 
will be  available  to  the  successful  tenderer  during  the  period  of the  contract. 
Directive  95/19/EC  went  some  way  to  addressing  these  links,  but  further 
clarification is needed. 
57.  It is  important that capacity can be  obtained with sufficient long  term certainty 
for the provision of this type of service, and that it is possible for the authority to 
be able to seek the capacity even if it  has not yet defined the operator. However, 
these  needs  must  be  set  against  the  needs  of the  infrastructure  manager  to 
manage the infrastructure efficiently, and the needs of other undertakings to access 
the infrastructure. 
International collaboration 
58. 
23 
The creation of international train paths introduces an extra dimension and set of 
problems that can be particularly damaging for freight.  On the one hand the need 
for collaboration can slow down the process, and is likely to impair the quality of 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  1191/69  (OJ  156,  28.6.1969)  amended  by  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1893/91 
(OJ  169. 29.6.1991). 
35 the  final  product  because  of the  difficulty  of dealing  with  all  the  interactions 
involved. At  the  same time, assurances are  required that decisions are made in a 
manner which is as fair as that for purely national traffic. 
59.  Where journeys cover long distances, it is inevitable that they are likely to involve 
increased interaction with other traffic  flows  as  well  as  the  likelihood that they 
will  need to  use capacity constrained track sections.  Set against this however, is 
the possibility that in  some circumstances they may offer potential for deviations 
to  avoid such constraints.  Appropriate attention must be paid to these difficulties 
and possibilities when establishing allocation rules and allocating capacity. 
60.  Some  improvements  can  probably  be  achieved  through  enhancing  the 
collaboration  between  the  different  bodies  responsible  for  capacity  allocation, 
further  improvements  may  be  possible  through  enhanced  communication  and 
exchanges of information.  In  any case,  the  timing of the  international  processes 
needs  to  be  closely  linked  to  the  national  allocation  processes  to  ensure  that 
neither process causes excessive constraints for the other. 
Rights to capacity 
61.  Current  Community  law  does  not  clarify  the  rights  associated  with  railway 
infrastructure capacity. The uncertainties which exist for railway undertakings are 
mirrored by uncertainties for the infrastructure manager. There is a need to clarifY: 
how  long  the  right  to  use  capacity is  granted  for;  what expectations users may 
have about their ability to  operate a similar service in  future;  and their ability to 
use capacity allocated with a particular service in mind for a similar but different 
service. There is also a need for clarification of whether there is a right to transfer 
capacity allocated to another undertaking with or without some compensation for 
such a transfer. 
Available capacity 
62.  Railway infrastructure capacity is  not something that can be precisely defined in 
terms of a number of train paths per hour, nor is it a concept which exists without 
regard to  factors such as the mix of traffic, the characteristics of the rolling stock 
and  so  on.  While  these  characteristics  mean  that  it  is  not  simply  a  matter of 
apportioning a given number of  rights between competing requests they also make 
the process of  determining which requests shall be met and how fully they shall be 
met a task which requires a considerable degree of openness and transparency to 
provide assurance that it  is carried out fairly.  Where there is scarce capacity the 
choices that must be  made  between competing needs  should be  made within a 
framework which is explicit. This will ensure that undertakings seeking capacity 
have an understanding of the likelihood of success thus enabling the avoidance of 
pointless effort and the production of more informed requests. It will also enable 
them  to  assess  whether  the  use  of those  criteria  has  resulted  in  an  outcome 
consistent with the stated principles. 
Role of  Information Technology 
63.  Information  technology  has  been  slow  in  amvmg  in  this  area  although  it  is 
beginning  to  play  an  increasingly  important  role.  Nevertheless  lack  of 
compatibility  between  systems  could  still  hamper  its  playing  a  full  role  and 
36 facilitating the establishment of train paths which cross network boundaries. It is 
desirable  to  monitor  progress  in  this  area  and  to  ensure  that  the  results  of 
Community and national research can be rapidly employed to assist in improving 
the allocation processes. 
Charges 
64.  There is an obvious relationship between the charges which are levied for  access 
to  scarce  capacity  and  the  allocation  of that  capacity  among  bidders.  Ideally 
charges should be set at a level to reflect the opportunity cost for the infrastructure 
manager of traffic which is priced off the network.  Then, in theory,  for a given 
infrastructure, there should be no allocation problem since bids for capacity should 
not exceed that which can be made available. 
65.  Where capacity constraints are identified through the allocation process this raises 
the question of  whether capacity should be expanded. Because of  the monopolistic 
position of the  infrastructure manager, it is important to ensure that appropriate 
processes  exist  to  address  the  constraints  in  an  open  way  and  to  ensure  that 
the views of all  parties are  taken  into  account  in  planning  what  enhancements 
are desirable. 
Section 4 - The Commission proposal 
66.  The main issues to  be addressed by mechanisms to charge for the use of railway 
infrastructure and to allocate capacity on it have been identified in Sections 2 and 
3. The fact that capacity has a value and that the level of charges will influence 
demand for capacity lead to strong links between these mechanisms and therefore 
the  Commission believes that a  unified approach needs to  be  taken  to  address 
these issues. As discussed above, the main objectives of  the proposal are: 
•  to  ensure  greater  efficiency  in  the  use  of rail  infrastructure  and  to  drive 
down costs; 
•  to make existing access rights effective, by clarifying charging and train path 
allocation rules; 
•  to facilitate the provision and use of high quality international train paths by 
harmonising allocation procedures and charging principles; 
•  to ensure  that charging and  allocation procedures do  not act  as  barriers to 
market entry. 
Independence of  regulatory functions 
67.  It is self evident that in view of  the need to provide assurance that these processes 
will  be  fair  to  all  undertakings,  it  is  necessary  for  the  allocation and  charging 
processes to  be  performed independently of any railway undertaking.  To ensure 
effective  collaboration  to  enable  the  efficient  operation  of  services  at  an 
international  level  there  is  a  need  for  these  bodies  to  collaborate  and  some 
requirements  are  laid  down  about  this.  There  will  remain  many  matters  of 
judgement in the allocation process which even with an unbiased decision maker 
may  be open to  dispute.  Where  negotiation on price forms  part of the  charging 
framework, this also will need to be closely supervised. This points to the need for 
37 a  powerful.  body  which  can  ensure  that  the  frameworks  are  fair  and  that 
discrimination  does  not  take  place.  Such  a  regulatory  body  will  oversee  these 
processes  and  deal  with  complaints,  imposing  conditions  on  the  parties 
where necessary. The proposal contains provisions to ensure that these objectives 
are met. 
Transparency 
68.  Users and potential users of  the infrastructure require information about access to 
the network and the  rules and procedures which apply both as  far as train path 
allocation and charging are concerned .. This information will include details of 
the infrastructure available, the rules and procedures for the allocation process and 
the methodology used for establishing charges as well as the charges levied where 
there is  a tariff.  It  is, therefore, proposed that infrastructure managers publish a 
"network statement" covering these  issues.  Such  a  published  statement  should 
function as a handbook for these aspects of  access to the rail infrastructure. 
Efficient management and provision of  rail infrastructure 
69.  . The  monopolistic  nature  of railway  infrastructure  needs  to  be  addressed  in  a 
number of ways.  The  performance of a  railway  operation requires  access  to  a 
number of different types of service. Many of these will only have one supplier, 
often the infrastructure manager. In view of this some safeguards are required to 
ensure fair treatment and set general rules which will apply to these. In addition, it 
is. important  for  more  efficient  railway  operation,  as  well  as  to  ensure  fair 
treatment that there is  greater clarity about infrastructure cost and its causation. 
Mechanisms are also required to provide incentives for infrastructure managers to 
take  steps to drive down the  cost of the  infrastructure and to  expand it,  where 
necessary. For scarcity constrained infrastructure, it is proposed that infrastructure 
managers propose a capacity enhancement plan. 
Charging principles 
70.  A major element of  harmonisation which is required is in the area of  the principles 
of charging.  The proposal aims to send correct signals about rail  usage through 
charges based on Short Run Marginal Cost. This will include charges relating to 
the scarcity of  capacity. The possibility to offer discounts forms part of  this system 
and  rules  are  proposed  to  determine  the  level  of discounts  which  should  be 
permitted  so  as  to  ensure  fair  competition  between  undertakings.  Another 
important area where charges are required is for external effects. Charges which 
will lead to a reduction in the production of external effects are highly desirable, 
but  safeguards  are  also  required. · In  the  absence  of an  intermodal  pricing 
framework,  it  is  proposed  that  charges  could  be  differentiated  in  function  of 
external costs but that this should not lead to an increase in average rail charges. In 
view of this it is also necessary to permit compensatory payments to take account 
of situations  where  competing  transport  operations  (e.g.  road  haulage)  are  not 
properly charged for the costs they impose on society. A number of exceptions to 
the  basic  charging  principles  would  be  permitted  where  there  is  either a  cost 
recovery target or where new investment is  required that could not be financed 
otherwise.  However,  in view of the importance of freight services to the single 
market no additional charges would be permitted for these. Essentially, two-part 
38 tarrifs and  negotiated  and  published ramsey prices would  be  allowed,  provided 
certain conditions were met to avoid distortions of  competition24. 
Incentives for efficient use 
71.  A  number  of  measures  are  required  to  encourage  optimal  utilisation  of 
infrastructure capacity and  fair  access.  It  is  important to  ensure that capacity is 
used when booked. Financial incentives can be created to achieve this. In addition 
general arrangements need to be defined for the return of capacity which has been 
requested but is  not used so that this does not artificially obstruct the use of the 
infrastructure.  To  provide  incentives  for  railway  undertakings  and  the 
infrastructure  manager  to  ensure  that  operations  are  not  disrupted  it  is  also 
desirable that economic signals are provided about the  cost of this.  This can be 
achieved  through  a  performance  scheme.  Specific  arrangements  may  also  be 
required where  an  infrastructure manager wishes to  optimise  infrastructure  use 
through dedicating specific infrastructure for a particular purpose.  This may for 
example  be  desirable  for  certain  freight  lines  or high  speed  track.  Where  this 
results in a more optimal use it is of course desirable, however some safeguards 
are  also  needed.  The  proposal  contains  various  provisions  that  are  aimed  at 
ensuring these objectives. 
Authorised applicants 
72.  A pumber of  different parties have an interest in access to railway capacity. While 
this  is  of essential  importance to  railway  undertakings  since  only they can run 
railway services, it is essential that those others who wish to use railway services 
but  require  certainty  about  their  future  needs  and  their  ability  to  receive  an 
attractive service can also have necessary rights. It is proposed that all persons or 
legal  entities  with  a  commercial  or  public  service  interest  in  procuring 
infrastructure capacity for the operation of railway services can do so (authorised 
applicants). Licensed railway undertakings would all be authorised applicants, but 
other bodies such as,  shippers and local governments, may also choose to  apply 
for  this status.  Obviously, only licensed railway undertakings with access rights 
defined  in  Directive  91/440/EEC  (or  wider  rights  granted  by  Member States) 
could actually carry out rail services. 
International train services as part of the timetabling process 
73.  To  ensure  effective  international  coordination of capacity  allocation  requires  a 
harmonisation  of  certain  timings  and  the  consideration  of  requests  for 
international  train  paths  at  an  early  stage  of the  timetabling  process.  This  is 
proposed .. In addition to ensure the efficiency of the process and to guarantP-e the 
ability of different  undertakings  to  participate  in  the  process  it  is  desirable  to 
establish general rules about making an application and the scheduling process. A 
similar purpose is served through ensuring that a broad set of general principles 
are followed when undertaking capacity allocation. 
24  These concepts are discussed in "Fair payment for infrastructure use: A phased approach to a common 
transport infrastructure charging framework in the EU", COM( 1998) 466 final. 
39 [nfrastructure scarcity 
74.  Where capacity is  scarce, common rules are desirable to  guarantee fair treatment 
and to promote efficient infrastructure use.  Rules are therefore proposed to define 
the  coordination  process  and  procedures  when  absolute  scarcity  arises.  These 
procedures are  linked  with  specific rules  for  addressing an absolute shortage of 
capacity  through  an  analysis  of its  use  and  then  a  requirement  to  develop  an 
enhancement plans where this is appropriate. 
Short notice requests and the use of Information Technology 
75.  A specific challenge concerns services which cannot be planned long in advance. 
These are often poorly served and measures are therefore proposed to  ensure that 
short-notice requests can be adequately accommodated on the  network.  This can 
particularly be assisted through greater use oflnformation Technology. 
Resolving disputes 
76.  The nature of  the allocation process with a constrained time schedule coupled with 
decisions  that  to  some  degree  will  be  matters  of judgement and  may  result  in 
commercial  benefit  to  undertakings  point  to  the  likelihood of disputes  arising. 
While unfair treatment must be open to appeal, it is also desirable to ensure that an 
arbitration  process  is  available  to  enable  the  speedy  resolution  of 
straightforward disputes. 
Section 5 
Legal base 
77.  This  proposal  is  put  forward  on  the  basis  of Article  75  of the  Treaty  and  ts 
therefore of exclusive competence of  the Community. 
Means of Action 
78.  The Community has already taken legislative action to  lay down broad rules for 
the  allocation  of capacity  and  charging  for  the  use  of railway  infrastructure 
(Directive 95/19/EC). However, these were only applicable to services carried out 
under  directive  91/440/EEC  and  it  has  been  noted  that  they  have  not  been 
sufficient to  overcome problems which can arise  from  legitimate interpretations 
within their  framework.  It is  clear  that  a  further  defining of the  processes  and 
principles to  be  used  is  needed  to  ensure efficient use  of railway  infrastructure 
capacity and development of the railway sector. This will need to take the form of 
legislative action, however the proposal is limited to those aspects which need to 
be  defined  at  Community level  and  leaves  the  administrative and  more  precise 
details to the competent :Iuthorities of  the Member States. 
Form of Legislation 
79.  It has been illustrated that action needs to  be undertaken for  the development of 
more  coherent,  non-discriminatory  schemes  of charging  for  access  to  railway 
infrastructure and of railway infrastructure capacity allocation. Nevertheless, not 
all  aspects of the  schemes need to  be  harmonised and indeed there are  perfectly 
legitimate reasons  for  certain substantial variations.  Charging schemes may  vary 
40 for example, for policy reasons and also to take account for instance of  geographic 
differences whereas capacity-allocation schemes may need to take account of the 
differences  in  traffic  types.  Such an approach can be  achieved by  the  use  of a 
directive which establishes broad frameworks  and  principles for the  scheme but 
leaves aspects and responsibility for its implementation to the Member States. 
Subsidiarity 
80.  Measures are  required  to  ensure  fair  access  to  the  market  for  the  provision of 
railway services and to ensure that charging and capacity-allocation schemes do 
not hinder the flow of goods throughout the Community. It is apparent that where 
measures are aimed at ensuring fair access to the market, these must apply to all 
relevant  bodies affected.  Thus while  it  may  be  legitimate  for  there  to  be  some 
difference between charging systems and capacity-allocation schemes, all systems 
must ensure non-discrimination between undertakings which have the right to use 
them. This measure does not address the question of access to the market but aims 
to ensure that there is equitable treatment where access rights exist. 
81.  In view of the network nature of the railway industry and the fact that it would be 
inappropriate to make a distinction between national and international traffic it is 
necessary to establish a common framework covering all services. A proposal that 
dealt  only  with  international  traffic  would  create  unnecessary  and  counter-
productive  distortions  to  the  market.  A  charging  scheme  with  different  prices 
applying to traffic travelling nationally or internationally would be discriminatory 
and  might  be  impossible  particularly  where  a  train  might  for  instance  be 
comprised of international wagons travelling as part of a purely domestic train as 
one  leg  of their journey.  Similarly for  the  allocation  of capacity,  national  and 
international traffic must use the same tracks and must be accommodated within 
the timetable.  It  is  therefore desirable that  processes and timing are  sufficiently 
harmonised  to  ensure  that  all  services  with  a  legitimate  right  to  access  the 
infrastructure are able to do so on a fair and non-discriminatory basis. To achieve 
these benefits requires legislation at Community level. 
82.  It  has  been  noted  that  there  is  benefit  in  some  degree  of harmonisation  at 
Community  level  of the  provision  of services  to  railway  undertakings.  The 
Common Transport Policy White Paper further identified the difficulty of tackling 
charging  problems  at  the  level  of individual  Member  States  because  of the 
competitive  effects  on industry  and  enterprises.  Measures  are  also  required  to 
ensure  that  the  international  allocation  of railway  infrastructure  capacity  is 
performed in a manner which complies with the Treaty. This clearly falls outside 
the competence of individual Member States and must therefore be addressed by 
Community legislation. 
83.  All  of these  factors  outlined  above  make  it  clear  that  action  IS  needed  at 
Community  level,  as  evidenced  by  Directive  95/19/EC,  to  define  the  broad 
principles  and  methods  of capacity  allocation  and  charging  systems,  while 
allowing the precise details to be fiW:d  in by Member States. It is for these reasons 
that the Commission is proposing this Directive. 
41 Summary of current railway infrastructure charging arrangements in 
the Community 
Austria 
Charges comprise an  annual  fixed  charge per km of route  used,  a variable  charge  per 
gross tonne km, and a variable charge per train-km. 
Belgium 
A system of infrastructure charging will be introduced during 1998. The revenue will be 
raised  from  a  system of variable charges.  The charge applied to  each individual train 
service will  be  calculated according to  a  formula  involving a common reference price 
(per train-km) multiplied by coefficients. 
Denmark 
Currently a simple charge is levied for each km of  the rail network used. A new system of 
charges  will  be  introduced  in  1999,  comprising a  fixed  annual  charge  per line  km,  a 
variable charge and a daytime capacity charge on the most heavily used line. 
Finland 
There is a  simple charge per gross tonne km, which differentiates betwee~ passenger and 
freight  trains,  plus an additional  charge per net tonne  for  freight  traffic,  which is  not 
distance related. 
France 
For high speed, suburban, and ordinary trunk routes there is a monthly fixed charge per 
km of route, a reservation charge per train km, and a usage charge per train-km. For other 
routes there is simply a reservation charge per train km. 
Germany 
Infrastructure charges are calculated on the basis of a set of standard charges per train-
km, which vary according to  the type and quality of the route and the type of train. The 
basic charges may be further adjusted to take account of requirements for higher or lower 
degrees of reliability; higher or lower than normal train weights; discounts are available 
of up  to  5%  in  respect of high  volumes of traffic,  and  up  to  6%  in  respect of long-
term contracts. 
Greece 
There no infrastructure charges are at present. 
Ireland 
There are no infrastructure charges at present. 
42 Italy 
There are no infrastructure charges at present. 
Luxembourg 
There are no infrastructure charges at present. 
The Netherlands 
With the exception of freight freeways, infrastructure charges have been set at zero until 
2000, reflecting political concerns about the impact of  introducing infrastructure charges. 
Portugal 
Rail infrastructure charges have not yet been introduced, and the charging framework will 
need to be approved by the regulator (who has not yet been appointed 
Spain 
There are no infrastructure charges at present. 
Sweden 
Infrastructure charges currently include:  a fixed  charge per axle per year,  which varies 
between different types of  rolling stock, variable charges and a traffic control charge. 
United Kingdom 
For  franchised  passenger  services  the  charging  framework  comprises;  a  large  fixed 
charge,  a  low variable  charge  and  a  performance  scheme.  The overall  level  of fixed 
charges was calculated so as to allow the Infrastructure manager to cover its total costs, if 
it achieves expected efficiency improvements. 
For  other  services  charges  are  negotiated.  For  freight  services,  mark-ups  should  be 
consistent with a structure of charges that enables the recovery of the fixed  costs of the 
freight network (but subject to a standalone cost ceiling on individual charges). For non-
franchised  passenger services, any mark-up should provide a share of the expected net 
benefits from a new service which is commensurate with its share of the risks associated 
with the service. 
In Northern Ireland with the exception of some freight services operated by IE for which 
it pays a simple annual fixed charge agreed with NIR, there are currently no infrastructure 
charges nor are there any plans to introduce infrastructure charges. 
43 Proposal for a 
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
98/0267 (SYN) 
relating to the allocation of  railway infrastructure capacity 
and the levying of  charges for the use of  railway infrastructure 
and safety certification 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community,  and  in  particular 
Article 75 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission25, 
Having regard to the opinion ofthe Economic and Social Committee26, 
Acting  in  accordance  with  the  procedure  laid  down  in  Article  189c  of the  Treaty  in 
cooperation with the European Parliament27, 
1.  Whereas  greater  integration  of the  Community  railway  sector  is  an  essential 
element of the  completion of the  internal  market  and  moves  toward  achieving 
sustainable mobility; 
2.  Whereas Council Directive 9l/440/EEC28  of29 July  1991  on the development of 
the  Community's railways  provides for  certain access  rights  in  international  rail 
transport  for  railway  undertakings  and  international  groupings  of  railway 
undertakings; whereas these rights mean that railway infrastructure can be used by 
multiple users: 
3.  Whereas Council Directive 95119/EC of 19 June 1995 on the allocation of railway 
infrastructure  capacity  and  the  charging  of infrastructure  fees2 9  set  out  a  broad 
framework for the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity; 
4.  Whereas those Directives have permitted a considerable variation in the structure 
and level of railway infrastructure charges and the form  and duration of capacity 
allocation processes; 
5.  Whereas  appropriate  capacity-allocation  schemes  for  rail  infrastructure 
coupled with  competitive  operators  will  result  in  a  better  balance  of transport 
between modes; 
25  OJC 
26  OJC 
27  OJC 
28  OJ L 237, 24.8.!991, p. 25. 
29  OJ L 143, 27.6.199.5, p. 75. 
44 6.  Whereas  encouraging  optimal  use  of the  railway  infrastructure  will  lead  to  a 
reduction in the cost to society of  transport; 
7.  Whereas there are a small but growing number of undertakings seeking to make use 
of the Community's rail infrastructure; 
8.  Whereas it  is  desirable for  purchasers of railway services to be able to enter the 
capacity-allocation process direct; 
9.  Whereas  the  charging  and  capacity-allocation  schemes  should  permit  equal 
and non-discriminatory  access  for  all  undertakings  and  attempt  as  far  as  is 
possible to  meet  the  needs  of  all  users  and  trat1ic  types  in  a  fair  and 
non-discriminatory manner: 
10.  Whereas  charging  and  capacity-allocation  schemes  should  encourage  railway 
infrastructure  managers  to  optimise  use  of their  infrastructure  for  society  as 
a whole; 
11.  Whereas  raihvay  unde11akings  should  receive  clear  and  consistent  signals  from 
capacity-allocation schemes which lead them to make rational decisions; 
12.  Whereas  it  is  desirable  to  grant  some  degree  of  flexibility  to  infrastructure 
managers to enable a more efticient use to be made of the infrastructure network; 
13.  Whereas capacity-allocation and charging schemes may need to take account of the 
fact  that  different components of the  rail  infrasttUcture  network  may  have  been 
designed with different principal users in mind: 
14.  Whereas  the  requirements  for  passenger  services  may  often  conflict  with  the 
requirements  for  freight;  whereas  the  requirements  for  passenger  services  may 
result in a  network which is  more costly to  build and maintain than one designed 
solely for freight; 
15.  Whereas the needs of  different services need to be properly balanced; 
16.  Whereas  the  increasing  speed  differential  between  freight  and  passenger  rolling 
stock can lead to an exacerbation of the cont1ict between these two types of  traffic; 
17.  Whereas services operated under contract to a public authority may require special 
rules to safeguard their attractiveness to users; 
18.  Whereas different users and types of users \viii frequently have a different impact 
on capacity; 
19.  Whereas  the  charging and capacity-allocation schemes must take account of the 
effects of  increasing saturation of  capacity and ultimately the scarcity of  capacity; 
20.  Whereas  the  different  time-frames  for  planning  traffic  t) pes  mean  that  it  is 
desirable to ensure that requests for capacity which are made after the completion 
of the timetabling process can be satisfied; 
21.  Whereas  the  use  of  information  technology  can  enhance  the  speed  and 
responsiveness of the timetabling process and improve the ability of applicants to 
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bid  t(>r capacity, as well as improving the ability to establish train paths which cross 
more than ont: infrastructure manager's network; 
Whereas.  to  ensure  the  optimum  outcome  for  operators  and  traffic  types,  it  is 
d-:sirable to  rt:quire an examination of the use of capacity when the coordination of 
infrastructure capacity is required to meet the needs of users; 
Whereas,  in  view of the monopolistic position of the  infrastructure manager,  it  is 
desirable  to  require  an  examination  of the  available  capacity  and  methods  of 
enhancing  it  when  the infrastructure capacity allocation process is  unable  to  meet 
the requirement of users; 
Whereas a lack of information about other railway undertaking's requests as well as 
about  the  constraints  within  the  system  may  make  it  difficult  for  railway 
undertakings to seek to optimise their capacity requests; 
Whereas it  is  important to  ensure the better coordination of allocation schemes so 
as to ensure the improved attractivene.ss of rail for traftic which uses the network of 
more than ont: infrastructure manager. in particular for international traffic; 
Whereas it  is  important to minimise the distortions of competition which may arise, 
either bet\\een railway infrastructures or between transport modes. from signiticant 
differences in charging principles; 
Whereas  it  is  desirable  to  define  those  components  of the  infrastructure  service 
which are essential to enable an operator to provide a service and which should be 
provided in return for minimum access charges: 
Whereas  investment  in  railway  infrastructure  is  desirable  and  infrastructure 
charging schemes  should  provide  incentives  for  infrastructure managers  to  make 
appropriate investments where they are economically attractive; 
Whereas any  charging scheme will  send economic signals to  users;  whereas it  is 
important that  those signals to  railway undertakings should be  consistent and  lead 
them to make rational decisions; 
Whereas  appropriate  charging  schemes  for  rail  infrastructure  coupled  with 
appropriate  charging  schemes  for  other transport  infrastructures  and  competitive 
operators will r-:sult in an optimal balance of  different transport modes; 
Whereas  it  is  desirable  to  allow  some  degree  of flexibility  to  infrastructure 
managers to vary charges so as to encourage more efficient use of the infrastructure 
network  for  example  the  ability  to  vary  train  paths  or  a  long-term  commitment 
by operators: 
Whereas. to enable the establishment of appropriate and fair levels of infrastructure 
charges,  infrastructure managers should record and establish the  valuation of their 
assets  and  dt:velop  a  clear  understanding  of cost  factors  in  the  operation  of 
the infrastructure; 
46 33.  Whereas  it  is  desirable  to  ensure  that  account  is  taken  of external  costs  when 
making transport decisions as  outlined in  the  Commission's Green Paper on Fair 
and Efficient Pricing3D; 
34.  Whereas it  is  desirable for  any  infrastructure charging scheme to  enable traffic to 
use the rail network which can at least pay for the additional cost which it imposes 
on society; 
35.  Whereas while negotiations for individual train paths could reflect the market value 
of the access, disparity of information may result in poor outcomes and the burden 
of  the negotiations may be excessive; 
36.  Whereas  a  railway  infrastructure  is  a  natural  monopoly;  whereas  it  is  therefore 
necessary to  provide  infrastructure  managers with incentives to  reduce costs and 
manage their infrastructure efficiently; 
3  7.  Whereas it  is  important to ensure that charges for international traffic are not such 
as to prevent rail from meeting the needs of the market; 
38.  Whereas the overall level of cost recovery through infrastructure charges will affect 
the necessary level of government contribution; 
39.  Whereas  discounts  which  are  allowed  to  operators  must  relate  to  actual  cost 
savings experienced; 
40.  Whereas it  is  desirable for  railway undertakings and the infrastructure manager to 
be provided with incentives to minimise disruption of  the network; 
41.  Whereas the  allocation of capacity is  associated with a  cost to  the  infrastructure 
manager,  payment for which should be required; 
42.  Whereas, in accordance with the principles of  subsidiarity and proportionality as set 
out  in  Article  3b  of the  Treaty,  the  objectives  of this  Directive,  namely  to 
coordinate  arrangements  in  the  Member  States  governing  the  allocation  of 
railway infrastructure capacity and the charges made for the use thereof, cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States in view of the need to ensure fair and 
non-discriminatory terms for access to the infrastructure as well as to take account 
of the manifestly international dimensions involved in the operation of significant 
elements of the  railway  networks,  and  can  therefore,  by  reason of the  need  for 
coordinated trans-national action,  be better achieved by  the  Community; whereas 
this  Directive confines  itself to  the  minimum required  in  order to  achieve those 
objectives and does not go beyond what it necessary for that purpose; 
43.  Whereas  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2830/77  of 12  December  1977  on  the 
measures necessary to achieve comparability between the accounting systems and 
annual accounts of railway undertakings31 ,  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2183/78 
of  19 September 1978  laying  down  uniform  costing  principles  for  railway 
undertakings32,  and Council Decision 82/529/EEC of 19 July 1982 on the fixing of 
30  COM(95) 691  final. 
31  OJ L 334,24.12.1977, p.  13. 
32  OJ L 258, 21.9.1978, p.  I. 
47 ratl!s  for  the  international  carriage  of goods  by  railJJ,  all  of which  were  last 
amended  by  the  Act  of Accession  of Austria,  Finland  and  Sweden,  are  now 
superseded and should therefore be repealed; 
44.  Whereas  the  requirements  of Directive  95119/EC  relating  to  safety  certification 
should be replicated in this Directive; whereas Directive 95/19/EC should therefore 
be repealed, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 
CHAPTER I 
Introductory provisions 
Article 1 
Scope 
l.  This Directive concerns the principles and procedures to be applied with regard to 
the  setting  and  charging of railway  infrastructure  charges  and the  allocation of 
railway  infrastructure  capacity.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  charging  and 
capacity-allocation  schemes  for  relevant  railway  infrastructure  follow  the 
principles  set  down  in  this  Directive  and  allow  the  infrastructure  manager  to 
market and make optimum effective use ofthe available infrastructure capacity. 
2.  This  Directive  applies  to  main-line  railway  infrastructure  used  for  domestic  or 
international rail services. 
3.  Stand-alone  local  passenger networks,  and  networks  such  as  tram  or  light  rail 
which  can  solely  be  used  for  the  provision  of urban  and  suburban  passenger 
services, are excluded from the scope of this Directive. 
Privately owned networks that exist solely for  the use  by  the owner for  its  own 
freight operations are also excluded from the scope of this Directive. 
4.  Railway undertakings and international groupings the business of which is  limited 
to  providing shuttle  services  for  road  vehicles  through  the  Channel Tunnel  are 
excluded from the scope of  this Directive. 
Article 2 
Definitions 
For the purpose of this Directive: 
(a)  'AllocatiQn'  means  the  allocation  of  railway  infrastructure  capacity  by  an 
infrastructure manager or allocation body. 
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48 (b)  'Authorised  applicant'  means  a  person  or  legal  entity  with  a  commercial  or 
public service interest in  procuring infrastructure capacity for  the operation of a 
railway service, who has complied with the necessary requirements to enable him 
to  seek to  book capacity and who wishes  to  reserve  the  use of capacity on the 
relevant railway infrastructure. This shall include licensed railway undertakings. 
(c)  'Capacity-constrained  infrastructure'  means  a  section  of infrastructure  for 
which demand for capacity cannot be fully satisfied even after coordination of  the 
different request for capacity. 
(d)  'Capacity enhancement plan'  means  a  measure  or series  of measures  with  a 
timetable for their implementation which are  proposed to  alleviate the capacity 
constraints leading to  the  declaration of a  section of infrastructure  as  "capacity 
constrained infrastructure". 
(e)  'Coordination'  means  the  process  through  which  the  allocation  body  and 
authorised  applicants  will  attempt  to  resolve  situations  in  which  there  are 
conflicting applications for infrastructure capacity. 
(f)  'Framework  agreement'  means  a  general  agreement  setting  out  the  railway 
infrastructure capacity needs of an authorised applicant over a period longer than 
one timetable period. 
(g)  'Infrastructure  capacity'  means  the  potential  to  schedule  train  paths  on  an 
element of infrastructure. 
(h)  'Infrastructure manager' means any body or undertaking that is responsible for 
establishing and maintaining railway infrastructure. 
(i)  'Network'  means  the  entire  railway  infrastructure  owned  and  managed  by  an 
infrastructure manager. 
(j)  'Network statement'  means  the  statement  which  sets out in  detail  the  general 
rules,  deadlines,  procedures  and  criteria  concerning  the  charging and  capacity-
allocation schemes. It shall also contain such other information as  is  required to 
enable application for capacity. 
(k)  'Railway undertaking' means any public or private undertaking the business of 
which is to  provide rail services for the transport of goods and/or passengers with 
a requirement that the undertaking must ensure traction. 
(l)  'Regulatory body' means the organisation which is  charged with overseeing the 
processes of railway infrastructure capacity allocation and charging schemes. 
(m)  'Scheduling  process'  means  the  process  which  begins  with  applications  for 
infrastructure  capacity  and  is  completed  with  the  production  of the  working 
timetable. 
(n)  'Short  notice  request'  means  a  request  for  capacity  which,  because  the 
requirement is not known sufticiently far  in advance, cannot be requested through 
the normal scheduling process. 
49 (o)  'Train path' means the infrastructure capacity needed to  run a train between two 
places over a given time-period. 
(p)  '\Vorking timetable' means the data defining all planned train and rolling-stock 
movements which will take place on the relevant infrastructure during the period 
for which it is in force. 
Article 3 
Network statement 
1.  The  infrastructure manager shall,  in  consultation with authorised applicants and 
other interested parties, develop and publish a network statement. 
2.  The  network  statement  shall  set  out the  nature  of the  infrastructure  which  is 
available  to  railway  undertakings.  It  shall  contain  information  setting  out  the 
conditions  for  access  to  the  relevant  railway  infrastructure.  It  shall  contain  a 
separate section setting out charging principles, and tariffs where appropriate, as 
specified in Article 7 and a section setting out capacity allocation criteria and rules 
as specified in Article 17. It shall also contain detailed information on procedures 
and deadlines to be followed. 
3.  The network statement shall be made available to all parties that are or may wish 
to be authorised applicants, at a charge not exceeding its cost of  publication. 
4.  The network statement shall be kept up to date, and modified as necessary. 
CHAPTER II 
Infr:astructure charges 
Article 4 
Establishing, determining and collecting charges 
1.  Member  States  may  establish  a  charging  framework  while  respecting  the 
managerial  independence  laid  down in  Article 7 of Directive  911440/EEC.  The 
establishing of specific charging rules, the determination of charges for the use of 
infrastructure  and  the  collection  of those  charges  shall  be  performed  by  the 
infrastructure manager. 
2.  Where  the  infrastructure  manager,  in  its  legal  form,  organisation  and 
decision-making  functions,  is  not  independent  of any  railway  undertaking,  the 
function  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  and  described  in  this  Chapter  shall  be 
performed  by  a  charging  body  that  is  independent  in  its  legal  form  and 
organisation and decision-making from any railway undertaking. 
3.  Infrastructure  managers  shall  collaborate  to  achieve  the  efficient  operation  of 
train services  which  cross  more  than  one  infrastructure  network.  They  may 
establish such joint organisations as are appropriate to  enable this to  take place. 
Any collaboration  or joint organisation  shall  be  bound  by  the  rules  set  out  in 
this Directive. 
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managers  shall  ensure  that  the  charging  system  in  use  is  based  on  the  same 
principles over the whole of  their network. 
5.  Infrastructure managers shall ensure that the application of the charging system 
results  in  objective,  equivalent  and  non-discriminatory  charges  for  different 
railway undertakings that perform services of equivalent nature in a similar part of 
the market. 
6.  An  infrastructure  manager  or  charging  body  shall  respect  the  commercial 
confidentiality of information provided to it by authorised applicants. 
Article 5 
Services 
1.  Railway  undertakings  shall  be  entitled  to  the  package  of services  that  are 
described in the Annex as the minimum access package as  well  as those of the 
services described in the Annex as access services which are required. 
2.  To ensure the safe operation of  the network, railway undertakings may be required 
by the infrastructure manager to procure a number of services. These services are 
described  in  the  Annex  as  mandatory  services  and  may  be  supplied  by  the 
infrastructure  manager  or  by  some  other  body  approved  by  an  independent 
regulatory body. 
3.  Where the infrastructure manager offers any of the range of services described in 
the  Annex  as  additional  services  he  shall  supply  them  upon  request  to  an 
authorised applicant. 
4.  Railway undertakings may request a further range of ancillary services, listed in 
the  Annex,  from  the  infrastructure  manager  or  from  other  suppliers.  The 
infrastructure manager is not obliged to supply these services. 
Article 6 
Infrastructure cost and accounts 
1.  Member States shall lay down conditions,  including where appropriate advance 
payments, to  ensure that the  accounts of an infrastructure manager shall,  under 
normal business conditions over a reasonable time period, at least balance income 
from  infrastructure  charges,  surplus  from  other  commercial  activities  and 
State aid,  on the one hand, and infrastructure expenditure on the other.  Such aid 
shall be made in accordance with Articles 77, 92 and 93 of  the Treaty. 
2.  Infrastructure  managers  shall,  due  regard  being  had  to  safety  and  to 
maintaining and improving the quality of the infrastructure service, be provided 
with incentives to  reduce the costs of provision of infrastructure and the level of 
access charges.  · 
3.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  the  provision  set  out  in  paragraph  2  is 
implemented,  either  through  a  contractual  agreement  between  the  competent 
authority and infrastructure manager covering a period of not less than three years 
51 which  provides  for  State  aid  as  referred  to  in  paragraph  1,  or  through  the 
establislunent of  an appropriate regulatory scheme with adequate powers. 
4.  Where a contractual agreement as described in paragraph 3 exists, the terms of  the 
contract and  the structure of the payments agreed to  provide financial support to 
the  infrastructure manager shall be agreed in advance to  cover the whole of the 
period of  the contract. 
5.  Infrastructure managers· shall develop and maintain an inventory of  assets that they 
manage,  which  shall  contain  their  current  valuation  as  well  as  details  of 
expenditure on enhancement and renewal of  the infrastructure. 
6.  The infrastructure manager shall establish a methodology for  apportioning costs 
between  different  types  of rolling  stock  and  operations,  based  upon  the  best 
available understanding of  cost causation. 
Article 7 
Statement of charges and charging schemes 
1.  The  infrastructure manager shall,  in consultation with the  authorised  applicants 
and other interested parties, prepare a statement of charges and charging schemes 
for inclusion in the network statement. 
2.  The  statement  shall  contain  appropriate  details  of the  charging  scheme  and 
sufficient information on charges that apply to  the  services  listed in ·the Annex 
which are provided by only one supplier. The statement shall contain information 
on the charging scheme in force as well as indications of likely changes in charges 
for the following five years. It shall contain a general analysis of sales and income 
which does not permit identification of the charges payable by an undertaking for 
a specific service. 
3.  Where  an  infrastructure  manager  implements  a  discount  scheme  as  defined  in 
Article I 0, a performance scheme as defined in Article 12, or reservation charges 
as  defined in  Article  13,  then  details of these schemes shall  be  included in the 
statement of  charges. 
4.  Upon receiving a reasonable request from an authorised applicant, the regulatory 
body  shall  require  infrastructure  managers  to  make  available  to  the  regulatory 
body,  within  one  month  and  free  of  charge,  sufficiently  detailed  costing 
information used for infrastructure charge calculations as well as data illustrating 
the basis on which they establish and apportion costs between different types of 
rolling  stock  and  services  to  enable  that  applicant  to  satisfy  himself that  the 
charges comply with the requirements of  this Directive. 
5.  To  permit  the  assessment  of the  feasibility  of operation  of  a  service  an 
infrastructure manager shall provide free of  charge, within one month of  a request 
from  an  authorised  applicant,  information  on charges  which  would  apply  for 
rolling stock types or services which are not covered in the published information. 
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Principles of charging 
1.  Charges for the  use  of railway  infrastructure shall be paid to  the  infrastructure 
manager and used to fund his business. 
2.  Member States may  require the infrastructure manager to provide all  necessary 
information on the charges imposed to satisfy them that the charges are levied on a 
non-discriminatory basis. 
3.  Without prejudice to paragraph 5, the infrastructure charge for the use of railway 
infrastructure,  which  comprises  the  minimum  access  package  and  any  of the 
access services required, shall be set at the cost that is directly incurred as a result 
of  the operation of  the traiiL 
4.  The infrastructure manager shall include in the infrastructure charge a sum which 
reflects the scarcity of capacity. This charge shall only be levied on identifiable 
segments  of the  infrastructure  which  are  subject  to  capacity  constraints.  The 
determination of the level of this charge shall be based on a methodology about 
which  interested  parties  shall  be  consulted  in  advance.  The  methodology 
employed shall be described in the statement of  charging principles. 
5.  The infrastructure charge may be modified by a charge to take account of  the cost 
of  the external effects arising from the operation of the train. Such a charge shall 
be differentiated as a function of the magnitude of  the effect caused. The level of 
these  charges  shall  be  based  on  a  published  methodology  on  which  railway 
undertakings that are either using or may wish to use the infrastructure have been 
consulted. In the absence of any comparable level of charging of  external .costs in 
other, competing modes of transport, any such charges shall result in no overall 
change  in  revenue  to  the  infrastructure  manager.  In  situations  where  the 
incorporation of  an external charge component leads to additional revenue, it is for 
Member States to decide how the revenue shall be used. 
6.  To  avoid  undesirable  excessive  fluctuations,  the  charges  referred  to  in 
paragraphs 3,  4  and  5 may  be  averaged  over a  reasonable  spread of trains and 
times. Nevertheless, the relative magnitudes of the infrastructure charges shall be 
related to the relative difference in costs between services. 
7.  Where services listed in the Annex as additional, mandatory and ancillary services 
may only be supplied by one supplier then the charge imposed for the service shall 
relate to the cost of  their provision based upon the actual level of  usage. 
8.  Charges  shall  be  levied  for  capacity  used  for  the  purpose  of infrastructure 
maintenance.  These  charges  shall  not  exceed  the  net  revenue  loss  to  the 
infrastructure manager due to the effects of  the maintenance. 
Article 9 
Exceptions to charging principles 
1.  In exceptional circumstances and for specific projects, charging arrangements for 
the use of infrastructure or improvements to existing infrastructure may be based 
53 on  the  long-run additional costs arising  from  the  investment made,  including a 
reasonable rate of return. Charges may only be set on this basis on the condition 
that the infrastructure manager demonstrates to the regulatory body that: 
(a)  the investment required would not otherwise have been made; and 
(b)  the investment and the charging scheme together result in an improvement 
in economic efficiency. 
2.  Member States should in principle seek to ensure that any service which is able to 
pay at least the cost which it gives rise to, is not prevented by the charging scheme 
from utilising infrastructure capacity. Where a charging body wishes to recover a 
higher level of costs than that permitted by Article 8(3), (4) and (5), then it may 
only  do  so,  for  services  other  than  freight,  by  imposing  additional  charges 
following one of  the sets of  rules laid down in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5. 
3.  A fixed charge may be levied on the railway undertaking making greatest use of 
an element of infrastructure and a system of fixed and variable charges levied on 
other railway  undertakings.  For this  purpose,  the  network may  be  divided  into 
elements;  each element of the  infrastructure  shall  be  no  less than  1 000 km in 
length. The charge shall be based upon, and shall not exceed, the costs which are 
associated  with  the  infrastructure  element  but  which  are  not  covered  by  the 
charges set out in Article 8(3). Where a fixed charge is levied, the charging body 
shall  ensure  that,  when  performing  an  equivalent  service  at  the  same  time  in 
the same market, other railway undertakings shall not face  an average charge or 
a charge  for  running  an  additional  service  either of which  is  more  than  10% 
greater than that which is paid by the railway undertaking making the greatest use 
of  the element. 
4.  Charges may  be  increased and modulated through negotiation in relation to the 
elasticity of demand for different services or types of services. This may only be 
permitted under the close supervision of a regulatory body and where safeguards 
are in place which ensure that charges to users who are dependent on rail transport 
are not excessive. Regulatory bodies shall, after consultation, prepare and publish 
rules to be followed.  Charges defined in this way shall be included in a contract 
between the infrastructure manager and the authorised applicant. 
5.  The infrastructure manager may publish tariffs,  distinguishing between different 
clearly defined traffic types,  which reflect the willingness to  pay  more than the 
costs  that  they  impose.  This  may  only  be  permitted  in  circumstances  where 
safeguards are  in place which ensure that charges to users who are dependent on 
rail transport are not excessive and that arrangements are in place to ensure that 
traffic  which  can  at  least  pay  the  additional  costs  which  it  imposes  may  be 
accepted.  Regulatory bodies shall supervise the  tariffs for  different traffic types 
and ensure that they are appropriate. 
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Discounts 
1.  Without prejudice to  Articles 85, 86  and  90  of the Treaty,  any discount on the 
charges levied on a railway undertaking by  the  infrastructure  manager,  for  any 
service, shall comply with the criteria set out in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4. 
2.  Discounts shall  not exceed the  actual  cost saving to  the infrastructure manager 
from  the  operation in comparison with  a single  isolated  equivalent journey.  In 
determining the level of  discount, no account may be taken of cost savings already 
internalised in the charge levied. 
3.  Discounts may only relate to charges levied for a specified infrastructure section. 
4.  Separate discount schemes shall apply for different types of  service. 
Article 11 
Compensation schemes for unpaid marginal external and infrastructure costs 
1.  Member States may put in place a time-limited scheme to compensate for the use 
of railway  infrastructure  for  the  demonstrably  unpaid  marginal  external  and 
infrastructure costs of  other transport modes in so far as these exceed the marginal 
external and infrastructure costs of  rail. 
2.  The methodology used and calculations performed must be publicly available.  It 
shall in particular be possible to demonstrate the specific uncharged costs of the 
competing transport infrastructure that are avoided and to ensure that the scheme 
is granted on non-discriminatory terms to undertakings. 
3.  Member States shall ensure that such a scheme is compatible with Articles 77, 92 
and 93 of  the Treaty. 
Article 12 
Performance scheme 
1.  Infrastructure  charging  schemes  shall  encourage  railway  undertakings  and  the 
infrastructure manager to minimise disruption and improve the performance of  the 
railway network.  This  shall  be  achieved  through  a performance  scheme  which 
provides  for  penalties  for  actions  which  disrupt  the  operation  of the  network, 
compensation  for  undertakings  which  suffer  from  disruption  and  bonuses  that 
reward better than planned performance. 
2.  The  basic  principles  of  the  performance  scheme  shall  apply  throughout 
the network. 
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Reservation charges 
1.  Infrastructure managers may levy a charge for capacity that is requested but not 
used according to the principles set out in paragraphs 2 to 6. 
2.  The charge shall be utilised in such a manner as to provide incentives for efficient 
use of  capacity. 
3.  -Where all requests for capacity can be satisfied without coordination, the charge 
shall, as a maximum, be no greater than the costs of  providing the path. 
4.  Where coordination is required, the charge shall, as a maximum, reflect the value 
of  the capacity requested. 
5.  Special  arrangements may  be  made where an  undertaking  has  an  agreement  to 
enable it to run one or more trains without specifying the exact times of  operation. 
6.  Reservation  charges  shall  not  be  collected  until  after  the  time  of  the 
capacity requested. 
CHAPTER III 
Allocation of  capacity 
Article 14 
Capacity rights 
1.  The right to  permit train operations on railway infrastructure shall  belong to  the 
infrastructure manager of  that network. 
2.  Capacity shall be allocated by an infrastructure manager and, once allocated to an 
authorised  applicant,  may  not  be  transferred  by  the  recipient  to  another 
undertaking  or  service.  The  use  of capacity  by  a  railway  undertaking  when 
carrying  out  the  business  of an  authorised  applicant  who  is  not  a . railway 
undertaking shall not be considered a transfer. 
3.  The right to use specific railway infrastructure capacity in the form of a train path 
may be granted to authorised applicants for a maximum duration of  one timetable 
period. 
4.  An infrastructure manager and an authorised applicant may enter into a framework 
agreement  for  the  use  of capacity  on the  relevant  railway  infrastructure  for  a 
longer term than one timetable period, in the manner laid down in Article 20. 
5.  Infrastructure  managers  and  authorised  applicants  shall  enter  into  contracts 
that define  their  respective  rights  and  obligations  in  respect  of any  allocation 
of  capacity. 
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Capacity allocation 
1.  Member  States  may  establish  a  framework  for  the  allocation  of  railway 
infrastructure capacity while respecting the managerial independence laid down in 
Article 7 of  Directive 91/440/EEC. The infrastructure manager shall establish the 
specific  capacity  allocation  rules  and  shall  perform  the  capacity  allocation 
processes.  In  particular,  the  infrastructure  manager  shall  ensure  that  railway 
infrastructure capacity is allocated on a fair and non-discriminatory basis and in 
accordance with Community law. 
2.  Where  the  infrastructure  manager  is  not  independent  in  its  legal  form  and 
organisation  and  decision-making  from  any  railway  undertaking,  then  the 
allocation function shall be performed by an allocation body.  Such an allocation 
body  shall  be  independent from  any  railway  undertaking  in its  legal  form  and 
organisation and decision making. 
3.  Infrastructure  managers  and  allocation  bodies  shall  respect  the  commercial 
confidentiality of  information provided to them. 
Article 16 
Collaboration to allocate capacity on more than one network 
1.  Infrastructure  managers  shall  collaborate  to  enable  the  efficient  creation  and 
allocation  of  capacity  which  crosses  more  than  one  network.  They  may 
establish such joint organisations as  are  appropriate to enable this to take place. 
Any collaboration  or joint organisation  shall  be  bound by  the  rules  set out  in 
this Directive. 
In particular, they shall establish an  organisation to coordinate the allocation of 
capacity  at  an international  level  that  includes  representatives  of infrastructure 
managers for all railway infrastructures whose allocation decisions have an impact 
on more than one  other  infrastructure  manager.  This  organisation may  include 
appropriate  representatives  of  infrastructure  managers  from  outside  the 
. Community.  The  Commission shall  be  informed and  shall  be  invited to  attend 
meetings of  the organisation as an observer. 
2.  At  any  meeting  or  other  activity  undertaken  to  permit  the  allocation  of 
infrastructure  capacity  for  trans-network  train  services,  decisions  shall  only  be 
taken by representatives of  infrastructure managers. 
3.  The participants in the collaboration referred to paragraph 1 shall ensure that its 
membership,  methods of operation and  all  relevant criteria which are  used  for 
assessing and allocating capacity be made publicly available. 
4.  Working in collaboration as referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1, 
infrastructure  managers  may  assess  the  need  for,  and  may  where  necessary 
organise  and  request  the  creation  of international  train  paths  to  facilitate  the 
operation at short notice of  freight trains. 
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applicants via any of  the participating infrastructure managers. 
Article 17 
Network statement - capacity allocation 
1.  .  The  infrastructure  managers  in  consultation  with  authorised  applicants,  other 
interested  parties  and,  where  appropriate,  other  infrastructure  managers,  shall 
prepare a statement of capacity allocation principles and criteria which shall form 
part of  the network statement. 
2.  This  statement · shall  set  out  the  general  capacity  characteristics  of  the 
infrastructure  which  is  available  to  railway  undertakings  and  any  restrictions 
relating to its use, including likely capacity requirements for maintenance. 
3.  The  statement  shall  specify  the  procedures  and  deadlines  which  relate  to  the 
capacity allocation process. It shall contain specific criteria which are employed 
during that process, in particular: 
(a)  the  modalities  according  to  which  authorised  applicants  may  request· 
capacity from the infrastructure manager; 
(b)  the requirements governing authorised applicants; 
(c)  the schedule for the application and allocation processes; 
(d)  the principles governing the coordination process; 
(e)  the  procedures  which  shall  be  followed  and  criteria  used  where 
infrastructure is ca.pacity constrained; and 
(f)  details of  specialised infrastructure designations; 
(g)  any conditions by which account is taken of  previous levels of  utilisation of 
capacity in determining priorities for the allocation process. 
4.  The statement shall detail the measures taken to ensure the adequate treatment of 
freight services, international services and short-notice requests. 
5.  The statement shall  be published  no  less  than  four  months  in advance  of the 
deadline for requests for infrastructure capacity. 
Article 18 
Principles of allocation 
In determining its statement on capacity allocation, the infrastructure manager shall have 
regard to the necessity or desirability of  factors such as: 
(a)  sharing the capacity and securing the development of the  infrastructure for the 
carriage of  passengers and goods for domestic and international traffic in the most 
efficient and economical manner in the interests of  all users of  railway services; 
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(c)  promotion of  competition in the provision of  railway services; 
(d)  maintaining and improving service reliability levels; 
(e)  satisfaction  of  reasonable  requirements  of  authorised  applicants  and  the 
infrastructure manager with regard to the future development of  their businesses; 
(f)  maximisation of  the flexibility available to the infrastructure managers with regard 
to  the  allocation of capacity,  but consistent with  satisfaction of the  authorised 
applicant's reasonable requirements; 
(g)  prevention  of any  imposition  of undue  constraints  on  the  wishes  of other 
undertakings  holding,  or  intending  to  hold,  rights  to  use  the  infrastructure  to 
develop their business; 
(h)  appropriate regard to  the financial  interests of providers of public funds for the 
purchase of  passenger services; 
(i)  providing incentives for good performance. 
Article 19 
Authorised applicants 
1.  Applications  for  railway  infrastructure  capacity  may  only  be  made  by  an 
authorised applicant. 
2.  The  infrastructure  manager  may  set  requirements  with  regard  to  authorised 
applicants  to  ensure  that  its  legitimate  expectations  about  future  revenues  and 
utilisation  of the  infrastructure  are  safeguarded.  Such  requirements  shall  be 
appropriate,  transparent  and  non-discriminatory.  The  requirements  shall  be 
published as part of the allocation principles in the  network statement,  and the 
Commission shall be informed. 
3.  The requirements in paragraph 2 may only include  the  provision of a financial 
guarantee that must not exceed an appropriate level which shall be proportional to 
the contemplated level of  activity of  the authorised applicant, and assurance of  the 
capability to prepare compliant bids for capacity.  • 
Article 20 
Framework agreements 
1.  Without prejudice to Articles 85, 86 and 90 of  the Treaty, an authorised applicant 
and  an  infrastructure  manager  may  enter  into  a  framework  agreement  that 
specifies the characteristics of the railway infrastructure capacity required by the 
authorised applicant over a period of time exceeding one timetable period.  The 
framework agreement shall not specify a train path in detail, but should be such as 
to seek to meet the legitimate commercial needs of  the authorised applicant. 
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infrastructure by other authorised applicants or services. 
3.  A framework agreement shall allow for the amendment or limitation of its terms 
to enable better use to be made of  the railway infrastructure. 
4.  The parties to a framework agreement may agree penalties in the event of  its being 
necessary to modify or terminate the agreement. 
5.  Framework  agreements  shall  in  principle  be  no  longer  than  five  years.  The 
infrastructure manager may agree to a longer period in specific cases. Any such 
exemption shall be justified by the existence of commercial contracts, specialised 
investments or risks. 
6.  While  respecting  commercial  confidentiality,  the  general  nature  of  each 
framework agreement shall be made available to any interested party. 
7.  Users with specific needs may wish to define aspects of  capacity in the framework 
agreement more closely than is normally permitted, in recognition of its economic 
or  social  importance.  Infrastructure  managers  may  take  account  of  such 
requirements for more specifically defined capacity, provided that it is purchased 
through a contract that recognises the cost of  this to the infrastructure manager and 
that it is compatible with the principles set out in the network statement. 
Article 21 
Schedule for the allocation process 
1.  The infrastructure manager shall adhere to the schedule for capacity allocation set 
out in paragraphs 2 to 7. 
2.  The working timetable shall be established once per calendar year. 
3.  The timetable change shall take place at midnight on the  last Saturday in May. 
Where a change or adjustment is carried out after the summer it shall take place on 
the last Saturday in September each year and at such other intervals between these 
dates as are required. 
4.  The  final  date  for  receipt  of requests  for  capacity to  be  incorporated  into  the 
working timetable shall be no  more than 12 months in advance of the entry into 
force of  the timetable. 
5.  No  later  than  11  months  before  the  working  timetable  comes  into  force,  the 
infrastructure managers shall ensure that provisional international train paths have 
been established in collaboration with other relevant allocation bodies as set out in 
Article 16.  Infrastructure managers shall ensure that as  far  as  possible these are 
adhered to during the subsequent processes. 
6.  Infrastructure managers shall agree international train paths to  be included in the 
working  timetable,  with  the  other  relevant  infrastructure  managers  concerned 
before commencing consultation on the draft timetable. Adjustments shall only be 
made if  absolutely necessary. 
60 7.  No later than four months after the deadline for submission of bids by authorised 
applicants, the infrastructure manager shall prepare a draft timetable. 
Article 22 
Application 
1.  Authorised  applicants  may  apply  to  the  infrastructure  manager  to  request  an 
agreement granting rights to  use  railway infrastructure against a  charge as  laid 
doWn in Chapter II. 
2.  Requests relating to the regular timetable must adhere to the deadlines set out in 
Article 21. 
3.  An authorised applicant who is a party to  a framework agreement shall apply in 
accordance with that agreement. 
4.  Authorised applicants may request capacity crossing more than one network by 
applying to one infrastructure manager. That infrastructure manager shall then be 
permitted to act on behalf of the authorised applicant to seek capacity with the 
other relevant infrastructure manager. 
5.  Infrastructure managers  shall  ensure  that,  for  capacity crossing  more  than one 
network,  authorised  applicants  may  apply  direct  to  any joint  body  which  the 
infrastructure managers establish. 
Article 23 
Scheduling 
1.  The infrastructure manager shall as far as is possible meet all requests for capacity 
Including requests for train paths crossing more than one network, and shall as far 
as possible take account of all constraints on authorised applicants, including the 
economic effect on their business. 
2.  The infrastructure manager shall ensure that, except as set out in Articles 20(7), 
25(3) and 27, no priority is  given to  any type of service or authorised applicant 
within the scheduling and coordination process. 
3.  The  infrastructure  manager  shall  consult  interested  parties  about  the  draft 
timetable and allow them at  least one  month to  present their views.  Interested 
parties shall include all those who have requested capacity as well as other parties 
who wish to have the opportunity to  comment on how the timetable may affect 
their ability to procure rail services during the currency of  the timetable. 
4.  The  infrastructure  manager  shall  take  appropriate  measures  to  deal  with  any 
concerns that are expressed. 
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Coordination process 
1.  During  the  scheduling  process,  when  the  infrastructure  manager  encounters 
conflicts between different requests then he shall attempt, through coordination of 
the requests, to ensure the best possible matching of  all requirements. 
2.  When a situation requiring coordination arises,  the  infrastructure manager shall 
have the right, within reasonable limits, to propose capacity that differs from that 
which was requested. 
3.  The  infrastructure  manager  shall  attempt,  through  consultation  with  the 
appropriate applicants, to achieve a resolution of any conflicts in the light of  the 
principles set out in Article 18. 
4.  The principles governing the coordination process shall be defined in the network 
statement. These shall in particular reflect the difficulty of arranging international 
train  paths  and  the  effect  that  modification  may  have  on  other  infrastructure 
managers. 
5.  When  requests  for  capacity  cannot  be  satisfied  without  coordination, 
the infrastructure  manager  shall  attempt  to  accommodate  all  requests 
through coordination. 
Article 25 
Scarcity of  capacity 
1.  Where after coordination of  the requested paths and consultation with applicants it 
is  not possible to  adequately satisfy requests for capacity then the infrastructure 
manager must immediately declare that element of  infrastructure on which this has 
occurred to  be  capacity constrained  infrastructure.  This  shall  also  be  done  for 
infrastructure which it can be foreseen will suffer from insufficient capacity in the 
near future. 
2.  When  infrastructure  capacity  has  been  declared  to  be  constrained,  the 
infrastructure  manager  shall  carry  out  a  capacity  analysis  as  described  in 
Article 28,  unless  a  capacity  enhancement  plan  as  described  in  Article  29  is 
already being implemented. 
3.  When charges levied under Article 8(4) have not achieved a satisfactory result and 
the infrastructure capacity has been declared to  be constrained, the infrastructure 
manager may in addition employ priority criteria to allocate capacity. 
4.  The priority criteria shall take account of the importance of a service to society, 
relative  to  any  other  service  which will  consequently  be  excluded.  This  shall 
include taking account of  the effect in other Member States. 
5.  The importance of freight services and in particular international freight services 
shall be given adequate consideration in determining priority criteria. 
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appropriate degree, take sufficient steps to ensure that it can accommodate short-
notice requests which are  foreseen  or foreseeable  at  the  time  of the scheduling 
process. It shall ensure that the ability to satisfy these requests is comparable with 
that for requests within the timetabling process. 
7.  The procedures which shall be followed and criteria used where infrastructure is 
capacity-constrained shall be set out in the network statement. 
Article 26 
Short-notice requests 
1.  The infrastructure manager shall ensure that at any time it is able to respond to 
short-notice requests  for  individual train paths in. no  more  than  five  days.  The 
average response time for this type of  request shall be less than two days. 
2.  Infrastructure managers shall where necessary undertake an evaluation of  the need 
for  spare capacity to  be  kept available  within the  final  scheduled timetable  to 
enable them to rapidly respond to foreseeable short-notice requests for capacity. 
3.  The infrastructure manager shall ensure that information on spare capacity which 
may be used to  satisfy short-notice requests  is  made available to  all  authorised 
applicants who may wish to use this capacity. 
4.  General statistics of  response times to short-notice requests and the outcome of  the 
requests shall be published for each timetable period referred to in Article 21. 
Article 27 
Specialised infrastructure 
1.  Unless  suitable  alternative  routes exist, railway  infrastructure  capacity  shall  be 
considered to be available for the use of all types of service which conform to the 
characteristics necessary for operation on the line. 
2.  Where there are  suitable alternative routes the infrastructure manager may, after 
consultation with interested parties, designate particular infrastructure for  use by 
specified  types  of traffic.  Without  prejudice  to  Articles  85,  86  and  90  of the 
Treaty, when such designation has occurred, the infrastructure manager may give 
priority to this type of  traffic when allocating capacity. 
Such designation shall not prevent the use of such infrastructure by other types of 
traffic  when  capacity  is  available  and  when  the  train  conforms  to  the 
characteristics necessary for operation on the line. 
3.  When infrastructure has  been designated pursuant to  paragraph 2, this  shall  be 
described in the network statement. 
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Capacity analysis 
1.  The objective of  a capacity analysis referred to in Article 25(2) is to determine the 
restrictions on capacity which prevent requests for capacity from being adequately 
met, and to propose methods of enabling additional requests to be satisfied. This 
analysis shall identify the reasons for the constraints and what measures might be 
taken in the short and medium term to ease the constraints. 
2.  The analysis shall consider the infrastructure, the operating procedures, the nature 
of the different services operating and the effect of all these factors on capacity. 
Any  measures  proposed  include  in  particular  re-routing  of services,  re-timing 
services, speed alterations and infrastructure improvements. 
3.  A  capacity•  analysis  shall  be  performed  by  the  infrastructure  manager  in 
consultation with current and prospective users of  the relevant infrastructure. 
4.  A capacity analysis shall be completed within two months of the identification of 
infrastructure as capacity constrained. 
Article 29 
Capacity enhancement plan 
1.  Within  six  months  of the  completion  of a  capacity  analysis  described  in 
Article 28, the infrastructure manager shall propose a capacity enhancement plan. 
2.  A capacity enhancement plan shall be developed in consultation with users of the 
relevant capacity constrained  infrastructure.  It will  identify the  reasons  for  the 
capacity constraint, the options for enhancement, the likely future development of 
traffic,  constraints on infrastructure development, the  cost of options including 
. likely  changes  to  access  charges  and  a  cost  benefit  analysis  of the  possible 
measures identified to enhance capacity. 
3.  The proposed plan shall  contain a plan of the action that shall be taken and  a 
timetable for implementation of  the measures. 
4.  Unless it is for reasons beyond his control, where an infrastructure manager does 
not make  progress  with  the  action plan identified  in the  capacity enhancement 
plan,  then  he  shall,  on  request  of railway  undertakings  using  the  relevant 
infrastructure, cease to levy any fees which are levied in respect of  the shortage of 
capacity for the relevant infrastructure. 
Article 30 
Use of train paths 
1.  Infrastructure managers shall impose conditions concerning the utilisation of  train 
paths which they grant to authorised applicants as set out in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4. 
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surrender of  a train path which, over a period of  at least one month, has been used 
on less than 75% of  the occasions for which it has been booked. 
3.  For infrastructure  sections where  coordination was required, but which are  not 
capacity constrained, the  infrastructure manager may require the surrender of a 
train path which, over a period of at least one month, has been used on less than 
75% of  the occasions for which it has been booked. 
4.  In the network statement,  an  infrastructure manager may specify conditions by 
which  it will  take  account  of previous  levels  of utilisation  of train  paths  in 
determining priorities for the allocation process. 
Article 31 
Infrastructure capacity for maintenance 
I.  Requests for infrastructure capacity to enable maintenance to be performed, shall 
be submitted during the scheduling process. 
2.  Adequate account shall  be taken  by the  infrastructure manager of the effect of 
capacity reserved for track maintenance on other authorised applicants. 
Article 32 
.Arbitration 
1.  The infraStructure manager shall ensure that an arbitration procedure capability 
which can reach a decision on a dispute within ten working days is available when 
it  allocates  railway  capacity  or participates  in  a  joint organisation to  allocate 
international  railway  capacity.  The  arbitration  shall  assist  in the  resolution  of 
disputes relating to the allocation of infrastructure capacity. The procedures and 
method of  operation shall be agreed in consultation with authorised applicants and 
shall be published as part of  the network statement. 
2.  Where arbitration is required, each participant shall pay its own costs. Additional 
costs of  the arbitration shall be shared equally between the parties. 
3.  When authorised applicants and an infrastructure manager or joint organisation of 
infrastructure  managers  request  arbitration,  they  shall  commit  themselves  to 
provide all information required to reach a decision and shall agree to be bound by 
the decision of  the arbitration body. 
CHAPTER IV 
General measures 
Article 33 
Regulatory body 
1.  Without prejudice to Article 32, Member States shall establish a regulatory body. 
This body shall be independent in its organisation,-funding,  legal structure and 
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or  authorised  applicant.  The  body  shall  function  according  to  the  principles 
outlined in paragraphs 2 to 8 below. 
2.  An undertaking shall have a right to  appeal to  the regulatory body if it believes 
that  it  has  been  unfairly  treated,  discriminated  against  or  is  in  any  other  way 
aggrieved,  and  in  particular  against  decisions  adopted  by  the  infrastructure 
manager concerning: 
(a)  the network statement; 
(b)  criteria contained within it; 
(c)  the allocation process and its result; 
(d)  the charging scheme; 
(e)  level or structure of infrastructure fees which they are, or may be, required 
to pay. 
3.  The  regulatory body  shall ensure that charges set by  the  infrastructure manager 
comply  with  Chapter  II  and  are  non-discriminatory.  Negotiation  between 
· undertakings and an infrastructure manager concerning the level of infrastructure 
charges  in  as  provided  for  in  Article  9(4)  shall  only  be  permitted  if these  are 
carried  out  under the  supervision of the  regulatory  body.  The  regulatory  body 
shall intervene  if negotiations  are  likely  to  contravene  the  requirements  of 
this Directive. 
4.  The regulatory body shall have the power to request relevant information from the 
infrastructure manager, authorised applicants and any third party involved within 
the Member State concerned, which must be supplied without undue delay. 
5.  The regulatory body shall be required to determine any complaints and take action 
to  remedy the situation within a maxim  WI) period of two months from receipt of 
all information. 
6.  A  decision  of the  regulatory  body  shall  be  binding  on  all  parties  covered  by 
that decision. 
7.  In the event of an appeal on a refusal to grant capacity, or on the terms of  an offer 
of capacity, the regulatory body shall either confirm that no  modification of the 
infrastructure manager decision is required, or it shall require modification of  that 
decision in accordance with directions specified by the regulatory body. 
8.  Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that decisions taken by 
the regulatory body are subject to judicial review. 
Article 34 
Safety certification 
1.  The arrangements for  safety certification for  railway undertakings  which are or 
will be established in the Community and the international groupings which they 
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Article 10 of Directive 91/440/EEC under the conditions laid down in that Article 
shall be in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of  this Article. 
2.  The  Member States  shall  provide that a safety certificate in which the  railway 
undertakings' safety requirements are set out be submitted in order to ensure safe 
service on the routes concerned. 
3.  In order to obtain the safety certificate, the railway undertaking shall comply with 
the regulations under national law, compatible with Community law and applied 
in  a  non-discriminatory  manner,  laying  down  the  technical  and  operational 
requirements specific to rail services and the safety requirements applying to staff, 
rolling stock and the undertaking's internal organisation. 
In  particular,  it  shall  provide  proof that the  staff whom  it  employs  to  operate 
and accompany  the  trains  providing  services  referred  to  in  Article  10  of 
Directive 911440/EEC has the necessary training to  comply with the traffic rules 
applied by the infrastructure manager and to meet the safety requirements imposed 
on it in the interests of  train movement. 
The railway  undertaking shall  also  prove that the rolling  stock making  up  the 
trains has been approved by the public authority or by the infrastructure manager 
. and checked in accordance with the operating rules applicable to the infrastructure 
used.  The  safety certificate  shall  be  issued  by  the authority  designated for  the 
purpose by the Member State in which the infrastructure used is situated. 
Article 35 
Report 
The Commission shall, four years after entry into force of this  Directiv~. submit to the 
Council a report, accompanied if  necessary by proposals for further Community action. 
Article 36 
Implementation 
Member States shall adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary 
to  comply  with  this  Directive  from  1 January  2000.  They  shall  forthwith  infonn the 
Commission thereof. 
When  Member  States  adopt  those  provisions,  they  shall  contain  a  reference  to  this 
Directive  or  be  accompanied  by  such  reference  on  the  occasion  of their  official 
publication. Member States shall detennine how such reference is to be made. 
Article 37 
Repeals 
Regulation (EEC)  No  2830177,  Regulation (EEC) No  2183178,  Decision 82/529/EEC, 
and  Directive  95/19/EC  are  hereby  repealed  with  effect  from  the  date  laid  down  in 
Article 36. 
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Entry into force 
This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication 
in the O.fjicial Journal of  the European Communities. 
Article 39 
Addressees 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 
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For the Council 
The President ANNEX 
The minimum access package shall comprise: 
(a)  handling of  requests for capacity; 
(b)  the right to utilise track capacity which is granted; 
(c)  use of  running track points and junctions; 
(d)  train control including signalling, regulation, dispatching and the communication 
and provision of  information on train movement; 
(e)  all  other  information  required  to  implement  or  operate  the  service  for  which 
capacity has been granted. 
Access services shall comprise: 
(a)  access to refuelling facilities; 
(b)  access to passenger stations, their buildings and other facilities; 
(c)  access to freight terminals; 
(d)  access to marshalling yards; 
(e)  access to train formation facilities; 
(f)  access to storage sidings; 
(g)  access to maintenance and other technical facilities. 
Mandatory services shall comprise: 
(a)  assistance  in  the  case  of serious  incidents  or  serious  disturbance  to  normal 
train movements; 
(b)  police intervention where necessitated; 
(c)  monitoring the compliance with safety and regulatory standards by undertakings. 
Additional services shall comprise: 
(a)  use of  electrical supply equipment for traction current; 
(b)  traction current; 
(c)  pre-heating of  passenger trains; 
(d)  supply of fuel; 
(e)  shunting; 
(f)  tailor made contracts for: 
control of  transport of  dangerous goods, 
assistance in running abnormal trains. 
Ancillary Services shall comprise: 
(a)  access to telecommunication network; 
(b)  provision of  supplementary information; 
(c)  technical inspection of  rolling stock. 
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explanation of  the individual articles in the proposal for a Directive relating to the 
allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of  charges for the use 
of  railway infrastructure and safety certification 
Article 1 
1.  This article defines the scope of the proposal. Measures are required to ensure that 
capacity allocation and charging schemes ensure fair access to the market for the 
provision of railway services and to ensure that they not hinder the flow of goods 
throughout  the  Community.  Paragraph  1 defines  the  purpose  of the  proposal, 
which  is  to  define  the  framework  for  the  allocation  of railway  infrastructure 
capacity, and for charging for the use of  railway infrastructure. 
2.  It is intended that the rules proposed here should apply to infrastructures which are 
available  for  the  use  of conventional  freight,  combined  transport  or passenger 
railway services. The proposal is not intended to address infrastructures which are 
specifically constructed and operated for  light rail  services, metros or trams. For 
conventional rail networks which are operated solely for the use of an undertaking 
in the course of its business then equally it would not be appropriate for the terms 
of  this proposal to apply. These limits are defined in paragraph 2. 
3.  Paragraph 3 repeats the exclusion contained within Directive 95/19/EC relating to 
shuttle services through the Channel Tunnel. 
Article 2 
4.  This article defines a number of  terms as they are used in the proposal. 
Article 3 
5.  Paragraph  1 of this article requires the infrastructure manager responsible for the 
network to  prepare, in consultation with users, a stC!tement.  Paragraph 2 requires 
that it shall set out: details ofthe network; of  the schemes in force for access to the 
network;  and  the  detailed  criteria and  procedures  which  will  be  followed.  The 
intention is  to  ensure that parties with a right of access should be able to  access 
this  information,  which  they  will  require,  in  a  straightforward  manner  and 
paragraph 3 requires the publication to be made available at cost. 
6.  It  is  not intended that the production of the network statement should present an 
excessive bureaucratic burden. From year to  year the network and its constraints 
will only change in so far as investment is undertaken or there are other physical 
changes. The deadlines and data that are  required in  the  submission of bids  are 
also likely to remain constant and matters such as the criteria for making decisions 
in the case of scarcity are also likely to  be broadly constant.  In  view of this,  it is 
unlikely  that  for  the  majority  of the  information,  these  changes  will  be  very 
frequent and paragraph 4 requires the statement to be modified as necessary. 
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7.  Paragraphs 1 and 2 require that the establishment of charges and their collection is 
performed by a body that is completely independent from any railway undertaking. 
Where  there  is  a  complete  separation  between  the  infrastructure  manager  and 
railway  undertakings  then  the  infrastructure  manager  could  perform  this  task. 
Paragraph  3  permits  infrastructure  managers  to  coordinate  their  charging 
. activities, this is particularly desirable for international services along the route of 
international  traffic  flows  so  as  to  ensure  that  decisions  by  individual 
infrastructure  mru:tagers  do  not  prevent  the  development  and  operation  of 
this traffic. 
8.  There may be reasons why an infrastructure manager will wish to vary its access 
charges to influence traffic patterns. It might do this under political or commercial 
pressure to favour a specific destination such as a port, or for its own commercial 
reasons, e.g. to encourage rail traffic to travel further over its own network thus 
resulting in higher revenues for it.  Such distortions are unlikely to  result in more 
efficient transport systems and therefore should be avoided as far as possible. It is 
therefore  desirable  that  an  infrastructure  manager  should  employ  the  same 
charging principles throughout the network. This is  required by paragraph 4 and 
will ensure that there is no distortion between routes or destinations. An exception 
is  made  in  this  paragraph  for  situations  where  specific  arrangements  have 
been made  to  facilitate  investment  that  might  require  a  departure  from  the 
standard principles. 
9.  Paragraph 5 places a requirement on the infrastructure manager to ensure that it 
does not discriminate between undertakings operating in the same market.  It  is  a 
fundamental  requirement  that  infrastructure  charges  must  not  discriminate 
between  different  users.  This  may  not  result  in  identical  charges,  but  if two 
undertakings using the same equipment perform the same service in a comparable 
market, then the only likely difference in charges should relate to any cost savings 
which the infrastructure manager receives. Paragraph 6 requires that infrastructure 
managers must not disclose commercially sensitive information provided to them. 
Article 5 
10.  This article is  concerned with the provision of services to  railway undertakings. 
Infrastructure managers frequently offer a wide range of services.  While some of 
these  will  inevitably only have  one  supplier,  for  example signalling, others can 
reasonably  be  provided  by  other  suppliers  e.g.  diesel  fuel  or  storage  facilities. 
Because of the monopoly position of the infrastructure manager, it is necessary to 
ensure,  as  required  by  Article  86(d)  of the  Treaty,  that  it  does  not  abuse  its 
position  and  require  customers  to  purchase  a  bundle  of unrelated  services  or 
charge excessively for those services which only it can provide. At the same time 
it is necessary to ensure that a railway undertaking may buy the services needed to 
exercise its right of access. These will vary from a minimum package of services 
required to operate a diesel train service through a range of  other services that may 
be purchased if  required. 
11.  Where there is potential for competing suppliers then there is a reduced need for 
strict  control  over  the  prices  that  may  be  charged.  There  is  merit  in  having 
harmonised ranges of services available and therefore five  levels of service are 
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everything  which is  required to  enable the  operation of a  diesel  powered train. 
Providing  the  operator  is  licensed  and  the  equipment  and  operation  safety 
approved, there should be no obligation to make further expenditure. Paragraph 1 
requires that these services are provided to the railway undertaking.  Paragraph 2 
deals with other services which the infrastructure manager may require a railway 
undertaking to procure, even though he may not supply them. Paragraphs 3 and 4 
concern other types of services which an undertaking will  require to  carry out a 
number of  activities and set out the conditions relating to them. 
Article 6 
12.  The purpose of this article is  to ensure that infrastructure managers have a good 
understanding of  the value of  their assets and the cost of maintaining them as well 
as of  cost causation within their business and have incentives to reduce costs. The 
intention is to encourage good commercial practice and goes beyond that required 
in Directive 91/440/EEC to have separate accounts for the infrastructure manager. 
Paragraph 1 replicates the requirement in Article 6(1) of Directive 95/19/EC for 
infrastructure  managers  accounts  to  balance  while  recognising  that  such 
contributions must respect treaty obligations. 
13.  Infrastructure managers are in a monopolistic position and are tijus less subject to 
competitive pressure and therefore less likely to ensure that costs are reduced and 
efficiency increased. Charging schemes can affect the willingness of  infrastructure 
managers  to  reduce  cost.  For  example,  where  charges  are  based  upon  the 
additional  cost  imposed  by  a  train  operation,  then  the  benefits  of any  cost 
reduction by the infrastructure manager would need to be passed on immediately 
to  railway  undertakings.  This  will  remove  any  incentive  for  the  infrastructure 
manager to  achieve  the  improvement  in the  first  place.  Therefore,  paragraph  2 
requires there  to  be  an obligation on the infrastructure manager to  reduce costs 
while paragraph 3 requires this to be achieved either through a regulatory scheme 
or a  contractual  arrangement  exceeding  three  years.  Paragraph  4  ensures  that 
where  a  contractual  arrangement  is  made,  this  should define  the  level  of State 
contributions in advance for the whole period of  the contract. 
14.  Incentives are also required  to  ensure  that investment is  undertaken  where  it  is 
needed  and  makes  economic  sense.  Both  of these  objectives  could  also  be 
pursued via  the  external  regulatory  scheme  or  a  contract  between  State  and 
infrastructure manager. 
15.  Paragraph 5 requires an inventory of assets and their valuation to be maintained by 
the  infrastructure  manager  while  paragraph  6  requires  the  establishment  of a 
methodology for  apportioning cost between different users of the  infrastructure. 
This is essential to enable charging based upon cost. 
Article 7 
16.  This  article  requires  infrastructure  managers  to  develop  a  statement  of their 
charging  principles  for  incorporation  in  the  network  statement  defined  in 
Article 3.  Not only do  efficient charging schemes need to  be  developed but  that 
the necessary information on the level and structure of charges needs to be openly 
available. To ensure  that charges and charging schemes are  reasonable and  fair, 
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propose  changes  to  the  infrastructure  charging  scheme  and  this  is  set  out in 
Paragraph 1. 
17.  Paragraph 2 ensures that the  necessary information is  included  in the statement 
including  information  on  revenues  and  foreseeable  changes  in  the  charging 
scheme over the next five years. Paragraph 3 requires information on other aspects 
of  the charging scheme to be included in the statement. Paragraph 4, requires more 
detailed  data  to  be  made  available,  to  enable  current  and  prospective  railway 
undertakings  and  other  users  to  ascertain  the  cost  of operating  existing  and 
potential services and to  understand how modifying their operations could affect 
the  charge  incurred.  Paragraph  5 ensures  that  similar  information  will  also  be 
made  available  for  any  type  of new  service.  Only  with all  of this  information 
openly available is it possible for railway undertakings to respond to price signals 
relating,  for  example,  to  wear,  energy  use,  capacity  shortages  or performance. 
These  requirements  will  lead  to  greater efficiency  in  rail  operations  as  well  as 
facilitating the introduction of  new services. 
Article 8 
18.  The proposed charging scheme for rail infrastructure is part of  the first stage of  the 
Commission's  approach  towards  ensuring  a  consistent  introduction of fair  and 
efficient infrastructure charging systems across all modes of  transport as set out in 
the  White  Paper  on  Infrastructure  Charging  in  Transport  (COM(l998)  460). 
In keeping  with the  general  approach,  the  rail  proposal  aims  at  better  aligning 
charges  with  marginal  costs.  The  various  provisions  aim  at  bolstering  the 
competitiveness of rail transport by providing a much more transparent, efficient 
and equitable charging structure and constitute an important step in harmonising 
rail  infrastructure  charging.  The  Commission  intends  further  developing  the 
charging system  over time  as  part of the  three  stage  approach proposed  in the 
White Paper. 
19.  Several features of the system are noteworthy: First, as  a transitional measure, it 
allows derogations from the marginal cost charging rule, enabling member states 
to  seek higher levels of cost  recovery through a non-discriminatory second tier 
charging system. This is,  however, not allowed  for  freight transport which is in 
direct competition with road haulage, a mode which, on a marginal basis, does not 
pay  for  its avoidable infrastructure costs.  Moreover, European rail networks are 
predominantly passenger networks.  Secondly, the  proposal allows compensation 
payments for unpaid marginal external and infrastructure costs in other modes of 
transport, thereby facilitating the establishment of efficient relative prices between 
different  modes  of transport.  Thirdly,  it  is  also  proposed  to  include  scarcity 
(congestion) charges. These are an integral component of marginal costs and their 
inclusion ensures that marginal cost based pricing can lead to satisfactory levels of 
cost  recovery.  Their  inclusion  is  also  vital  in  order  to  ensure  that  efficient 
incentives  are  provided  to  authorised  applicants  who  apply  for  scarce 
infrastructure,  thereby  enhancing  the  efficiency  of the  train  path  allocation 
process. Obviously, their inclusion would render rail transport more competitive 
vis-a-vis road transport because it ensures that incentives are in place to keep high 
value  added traffic on the rail system.  Finally, differentiation of charges on the 
basis  of external  costs  is  permitted,  but  increases  in  average  charges  are  not 
allowed until equivalent charging systems are in place in other modes of  transport. 
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methodology  for  estimating  external  costs  and  developing  appropriate 
charging systems. 
20.  Paragraph  1  ensures  that  charges,  which  are  levied  for  the  use  of railway 
infrastructure,  shall,  not  only  be  paid  to,  but  be  retained  by  the  infrastructure 
manager.  The  objective  is  to  ensure  that  the  infrastructure  manager  has  an 
incentive to boost traffic volumes, and also has an interest in making best use of 
the network. If  the infrastructure manager does not retain the charges then this link 
is lost. 
21.  Paragraph 2 requires the provision of information by the infrastructure manager to 
the Member State so that it may verify that there is no price discrimination, this is 
identical to Article 9(2) of  Directive 95/19/EC. 
22.  Paragraph  3  defines  the  basic  requirements  of infrastructure  charges  for  the 
minimum service package. The first sentence requires the level of  the charge to be 
that which will result in optimal use of the infrastructure, that is to say that fees 
should  be  based  upon the  additional  cost  caused  by  the  operation  of the  train. 
While this provides the basis for the charges, the charge may be higher as a result 
of  other elements. 
23.'  Paragraph  4  requires  charges  to  reflect  scarcity  of capacity.  At  high  levels  of 
capacity  utilisation,  infrastructure  managers  may  find  that  they  cannot  satisfy 
authorised  applicants'  demands  for  access.  Initially,  this  might  mean  that 
authorised applicants are  unable to  obtain the  train paths,  or the journey times, 
they  would  like.  At  locations  with  extremely  high  demand,  it  may  mean  that 
services  or authorised  applicants  are  unable  to  access  the  network  at  all.  For 
efficiency  reasons,  the  opportunity  cost  (i.e.  the  net  revenue  foregone  by  the 
infrastructure manager because the same capacity could have been sold to  other 
operators)  should  therefore  be  included  in  the  infrastructure  fees.  Where 
opportunity costs are  included in  infrastructure fees,  this will ensure that scarce 
capacity is allocated efficiently between competing users. However, it is important 
in  view of the monopolistic position of the infrastructure manager,  that he  must 
consult with interested parties to ensure that the charging methodology is optimal. 
24.  Paragraph  5  is  concerned  with  charging  for  external  effects  arising  from  rail 
transport. It is entirely appropriate and desirable for charging mechanisms to take 
account of the external effects of the use of the infrastructure.  Where competing 
modes  of transport  do  not  pay  comparable  charges  for  external  costs,  it  is 
important that  the  changes  in railway  infrastructure  charges  to  reflect  different 
levels of impact on society should not disadvantage rail. This would arise through 
a net increase in the infrastructure manager's revenue and is therefore prohibited. 
This paragraph should be read with Article 11, which provides for compensation 
schemes  where  a  competing  transport  mode  fails  to  pay  a  comparable  level 
of  charges. 
25.  It is  important that such charges must be  calculated on a clear and  transparent 
basis and the methods of calculation published. Careful consideration will need to 
be given to the use of revenues from this type of charge. When such mechanisms 
are put in place they need to reflect the fact that it is not the infrastructure manager 
who is suffering the burden of  the cost, and must not provide incentives for him to 
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higher revenues. For this reason it may be desirable that revenues do not accrue to 
the infrastructure manager but are used for the general alleviation of impacts and 
improvement of the transport situation. In all cases, mechanisms to influence the 
level of external costs need to  be  realistic and non-discriminatory and should be 
developed  in  consultation  with  railway  undertakings  who  will  use  the 
infrastructure. 
26.  Paragraph 6 permits a degree of averaging of charges. There are two reasons for 
this, first the cost of continuously recalculating charges and second the need for 
some  predictability.  It may  be  costly to  calculate  specific  charges  for  different 
types of train service, different parts of the network and at different times of the 
day  or  week,  particularly  if costs  also  change  over  time  and  therefore  would 
require frequent recalculation. Averaging will involve a trade-off between the cost 
of recalculating a detailed set of charges and the accompanying uncertainty for 
users  set  against  the  likely welfare  loss  (in  terms  of under or over use  of the 
network) from  basing charges on averaged cost data. The nature of this welfare 
loss will depend on the way in which average costs are calculated. For example 
the impact of averaging charges between peak and off-peak periods is likely to be 
far  more  serious  than  the  impact  of averaging  between  off-peak  periods  on 
different days of  the week. 
27.  Excessive variation in  charges can make it difficult for  railway undertakings to 
plan services,  particularly those involving major investment decisions or where 
services are planned long in advance and they require a firm price for future access 
rights. For example, a new service introduced on a route with no capacity shortage 
may become uneconomic if  charges rise as a result of increased congestion on that 
route. Therefore, undertakings may prefer stable prices, which would require price 
variations to be smoothed out and this is permitted. It is desirable to publish likely 
price changes over time, and this was required in Article 7(2). 
28.  Paragraph  7  requires  the  charges  for  services  which  are  listed  as  mandatory, 
additional, and ancillary, but which only have one supplier to relate to the cost of 
their  provision.  This  would  permit  a  reasonable  level  of profit,  but  prevent 
exploitation of a dominant  position.  Where  there  is  a choice  between  multiple 
suppliers, competition should ensure that prices are appropriate. 
29.  Paragraph 8 permits charges to  be levied for capacity which is taken out of use to 
permit infrastructure maintenance. The charges should not exceed the net revenue 
loss to the infrastructure manager had the maintenance not been performed and the 
track had  instead been in use.  The levying of such charges will  provide a good 
economic  signal  of the  cost  of the  track  possession  and  provide  incentives  to 
perform the maintenance at the least disruptive times and find means of reducing 
the length of  time required. 
Article 9 
30.  This article deals with methods of covering a high proportion of  rail infrastructure 
costs through charges. Efficient pricing based on marginal costs would generally 
recover  only  a  relatively  small  proportion  of total  rail  infrastructure  costs. 
However, a number of Member States will wish to  recover a higher level of cost. 
There are  a number of concerns about this.  In  the  first  place, this has distorting 
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effect as  a  tax  on rail  infrastructure and such a  tax will  be  more  distorting in 
its effect than a -more general tax. The need to meet cost recovery targets accounts 
for  many  of the  inefficiencies  in  current  charging  frameworks  in  use  in  the 
Member States. 
31.  Where it is necessary for the infrastructure manager to levy charges which lead to 
revenues systematically higher than marginal  cost then careful consideration is 
required of  the impact of  those charges on rail traffic in general and their effect on 
individual railway undertakings.  It is particularly important that charges are  not 
based on average costs or anything that approximates this as it provides a major 
disincentive to attract traffic which can cover at least the costs ~hich  it imposes. A 
number of different systems are possible. It is essential that any system employed 
is  non-discriminatory  and  this  requirement  will  lead  to  the  need  for  certain 
safeguards depending on the system employed. It is equally important that where 
there are classes of users who are rail dependent, limits should be placed on the 
charges which can be imposed upon them. Finally, even where a higher level of 
cost recovery is sought, the system should still enable a user, who could at least 
cover the cost that he causes, to operate on the network. 
32.  Paragraph 1 provides for special arrangements to enable charges to be higher than 
marginal cost up to the level of  the additional costs imposed in the long run, where 
this is required to cover the cost of  investment. Provisions (a) and (b) require it to 
be shown that without charges at this level the investment would not have been 
undertaken and crucially that the combination of  the investment and the resulting 
charges will lead to enhanced efficiency of  the transport system. 
33.  Where a higher degree of cost coverage is  required from  charges,  a number of 
options exist. 
34.  The use of fixed  charges,  which do  not vary with traffic  levels,  may enable  a 
higher degree of cost recovery while still allowing variable charges to. reflect the 
additional  cost  of traffic.  However,  fixed  charges  may  deter  potential  new 
undertakings, or distort competition between large and small undertakings. 
35.  Alternatively a higher level of cost recovery may be  achieved through variable 
charges set above the  additional cost.  There are  a  number of different ways  in 
which this can be achieved, some of which result in more distortion than others. 
Ramsey Pricing (which involves setting mark-ups over SRMC which are inversely 
proportional to demand elasticity) should minimise the impact on the total volume 
of  traffic. 
36.  Paragraph 2 requires that, for freight traffic, infrastructure charges may not exceed 
the efficient price, determined in Article 8.  For other traffic, higher charges may 
be levied based upon paragraphs 3 to 5. 
3  7.  Paragraph 3 requires that where fixed  charges are employed, measures must be 
taken to ensure that railway undertakings are  not disadvantaged through facing 
substantially higher  average  or marginal  fees.  Multi-part  tariffs  where  a  fixed 
element is payable for access to a part of the network for a significant period of 
time can provide a substantial hurdle for any potential undertaking to overcome 
and will remain a substantial  dis-benefit to  undertakings other than the  largest 
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imposed for short sections of  track because this has the effect of being virtually an 
average cost charge. In view of  this the lower limit of  an infrastructure element for 
the application of  fixed charges is set as 1  OOOkm. 
38.  Paragraphs 4 and 5 deal with the situation where mark-ups are used to assist in 
achieving a higher level of  cost recovery by enabling an infrastructure manager to 
extract maximum revenue from each traffic. Paragraph 4 deals with the situation 
where charges are negotiated. Because of  the great danger of  discrimination either 
deliberately or as a result of different undertakings' market position this type of 
system can only be permitted where there  is  an effective  system of regulation 
which can ensure that deals made are not discriminatory. The rules to be followed 
shall be prepared by the regulatory body in consultation with users. It is important 
to ensure that the costs of performing the negotiations are not excessive and that 
as  far  as  possible  undertakings  are  sufficiently  well  informed  to  be  able  to 
negotiate. Paragraph 5 deals with the situation where tariffs are published that vary 
depending  on  market  segment.  Here  there  is  less  danger  of discrimination 
although it is still necessary to ensure that the tariffs are applied in a fair manner. 
This system runs the risk of pricing traffic, that could cover the additional costs 
that  it imposes,  off the  infrastructure.  This would be inefficient  and therefore 
provision must be  included to  enable special exemptions to be made to enable 
such traffic to operate. 
Article 10 
39.  This article details limits to discount schemes. The Commission's decision on the 
Zaventem  airport  charges  case34  set  out  principles  which  should  govern  any 
discount  which  is  offered  by  an  undertaking  in  a  dominant  position.  The 
Commission considered that in  this  case  a  system of discounts could only  be 
justified on the basis of any cost savings to  the  manager of the  infrastructure. 
The cost savings arising from an applicant submitting a large number of requests 
for  capacity ~e likely to  be quite small and this  will  govern the likely size of 
any discount. 
40.  Paragraph 2 requires that such a scheme may only reflect actual identifiable cost 
savings to the infrastructure manager. Where an infrastructure manager provides 
for  a discount scheme, such a scheme could confer unfair advantage on one or 
more undertakings. If  a scheme applied to a whole network it is clear that the only 
undertaking likely to qualify would be the existing national railway undertaking 
and that this must be prohibited. This is the intention of  paragraph 3.  Even where 
a scheme applies at the level of an infrastructure element it can be unfair in that 
one undertaking may only offer freight services yet for example both freight and 
passenger  services  are  counted  together  toward  the  discount  for  no  objective 
reason. This is prevented by paragraph 4. 
34  Commission Decision 95/364/EC of28 June 1995, OJ L 216, 12.9.1995. 
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41.  Distortion  between  different  transport  modes  is  likely  to  arise  as  a  result  of a 
failure to fully charge users of  one mode of  transport or type of  transport for all its 
marginal  costs.  While  full  charging of marginal  costs  is  the  first  best solution, 
where a Member State has not taken measures to  achieve this in other modes of 
transport, then they must be free to provide appropriately calculated compensation 
to  railway  operations  and  this  is  provided  for  in  paragraph  I.  Such  schemes 
shall be calculated to take account of the different impact of transport modes on 
society. The compensation must be calculated on a clear and transparent basis and 
· the  methods  of calculation  must  be  published  as  required  by  paragraph  2. 
Member States  should take  account of the  comment of interested  bodies  when 
elaborating such a scheme. Member States will need to ensure that such schemes 
to  compensate  users  of rail  infrastructure  for  specific  unpaid  external  costs  of 
competing transport  modes  are  compatible  with  Articles  77,  92  and  93  of the 
Treaty as  set out in paragraph 3.  The Commission is likely to propose a specific 
exemption in the revision of Regulation (EEC) No  Il07/70 setting out the basis 
on which such schemes will  be  approved,  including requirements that the  cost 
valuation be strictly proven and that the scheme be  resubmitted for  approval at 
regular intervals. 
Article 12 
42.  The charging framework should provide appropriate incentives for  both railway 
undertakings and the infrastructure manager to improve performance. Paragraph I 
requires the introduction of performance incentives within the charging system. 
Incentives  are  required  to  minimise  disruption  and  are  probably  best  achieved 
through  the  use  of a  monitoring  process  and  performance  scheme  where 
undertakings pay penalties when they cause delay and receive compensation when 
they are delayed or bonuses if they exceed planned performance.  Corresponding 
payments should arise  where  the  infrastructure manager is  at  fault.  If linked to 
charges,  an  incentive  mechanism will  require  charges  to  vary  independently of 
costs, so that revenue may rise or fall  in response to  good or poor performance. 
Paragraph 2 requires the scheme to be applied equally throughout the network and 
to all undertakings. 
Article 13 
43.  This article describes the framework that should apply for the levying of charges 
for  the  reservation  of capacity.  This  expands  on  the  previous  requirements  of 
Article 12 of  Directive 95/19/EC. It is important that an undertaking should not be 
able to prevent another undertaking from obtaining the capacity needed to perform 
a railway service by booking large amounts of capacity. This needs to be balanced 
against the desirability for undertakings not to  be penalised for trying to  develop 
new services. Paragraph 2 establishes a general requirement for these charges to 
encourage efficient use of the infrastructure capacity. Paragraphs 3 and 4 describe 
the  maximum  levels  of charge  which  may  be  levied  in  certain  circumstances. 
Paragraph  5  enables  special  arrangements  for  example  where  capacity  is  only 
required by an undertaking on an occasional basis and at other times the capacity 
is  available  for  other uses.  Paragraph  6  requires  that  any  charges  may  not  be 
collected  until  the  time  when  the  capacity  requested  has  passed.  While  the 
infrastructure  manager  should  have  adequate  assurance  that  it  will  be  able  to 
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development of  the market and be in particular a barrier to smaller undertakings. 
Article 14 
44.  This article defines the terms under which the right to use railway infrastructure 
capacity may be granted.  This has important ramifications  for  the  provision of 
services  operated  under  contract  to  a  public  authority,  for  the  ability  for 
undertakings to develop new services, for freight customers to obtain competitive 
offers for services they require and the development of  the railway sector. In view 
of this it  is  important to  clarify the extent of the right,  including  the ability to 
effect transfers of  it. 
45.  For services operated under contract to a public authority it is desirable to ensure 
that if the authority decides to contract with a different supplier of services, then 
the service may continue to be purchased by the local authority. This implies that 
the right to the capacity must not belong to the previous undertaking providing the 
service. There may also be situations where it is desirable for public authorities to 
seek  capacity  for  the  operation  of services  before  they  have  appointed  the 
undertaking that will provide the service. 
46.  In  view of these needs it is  desirable that the ownership of the  capacity of the 
railway  infrastructure  to  carry  trains  rests  with  the  infrastructure  manager  as 
required in paragraph 1. Paragraph 2 requires that the allocation of these rights is 
performed by the infrastructure manager. Once allocated, the right must be used or 
retumed·to the infrastructure manager, it cannot be transferred even within one 
company since this  would undermine the role  of the  infrastructure  manager in 
making decisions on the optimal use of the limited capacity. Paragraph 3 permits 
the  granting of right  to  applicants  to  use  specific  capacity  over  one timetable 
period. The allocation of a train path for a timetable period provides a short term 
right  for  the  applicant  to  use  that  train . path  subject  to  the  agreed  terms  and 
conditions of  access. Paragraph 4 provides for arrangements to be made for longer 
term capacity needs and which are dealt with more fully in Article 20. Paragraph 5 
requires  the  establishment  of legally  enforceable  contracts  which  specify  the 
agreements that have been entered into. 
Article 15 
4  7.  This article sets requirements for the performance of capacity allocation.  Where 
there  is  a  dominant  railway  undertaking  closely  linked  to  the  infrastructure 
manager,  other railway undertakings may have  reasonable fears  concerning the 
impartiality of the allocation process. In this case the only effective solution is to 
require that the allocation process be performed by a body which is  completely 
independent  from  any  user  of the  infrastructure.  Ideally  this  will  be  the 
infrastructure manager as set out in paragraph 1.  Paragraph 2 ensures that where 
there is not a clear legal and managerial separation of the infrastructure manager 
from  railway undertakings then a  separate allocation body must undertake  this 
task.  Paragraph  3  requires  the  commercial  sensitivity  of information  to  be 
respected during the allocation process. 
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48.  To create the possibility of  offering an international train service it is necessary to 
ensure that capacity can ·be reserved in a coordinated manner in more than one 
network. At present train paths tend to  be allocated on a national basis and then 
adapted through the Forum Train Europe process to enable them to be usable. This 
can frequently result in poor paths particularly where the service has a low priority 
e.g. freight.  Better coordination is required, with to  as large a degree as possible 
comparable access conditions, processes and criteria.  Coordination may be  best 
performed  bi-laterally  for  services -across  a  border,  multilaterally  for  an 
international route such as the Freight Freeways which have been put in place, or 
in a multilateral forum. 
49.  Paragraph I establishes an obligation for infrastructure managers to collaborate in 
any appropriate manner with other infrastructure managers to enable the efficient 
creation and allocation of  capacity crossing multiple networks. This is of  course of 
greatest significance for  the  international routes.  In any of these situations it is 
essential that  similar conditions  apply  to  the collaboration as  to  the  individual 
bodies. This will apply in particular to; the methods of  decision making, provision 
of  infonnation,  and  confidentiality  of  infonnation  provided  by  applicants. 
Paragraph 2 requires that an organisation be created to coordinate the international 
allocation of capacity.  It acknowledges  that  such  an  organisation  will  need  to 
incorporate  representatives  from  railway  infrastructure  bodies  outside  the 
Community and requires that the Commission should be both kept informed of  the 
activities of  this organisation and permitted to attend meetings. 
50.  Paragraph  2  establishes  that  in  parallel  with  the  arrangements  for  individual 
infrastructure managers, decisions must be taken only by infrastructure managers 
and not by railway undertakings or their representatives. Paragraph 3 requires that 
when  collaborating  in  this  way,  infrastructure  managers  shall  ensure  that 
information  on  the  membership  of such  collaboration,  as  well  as  sufficient 
information  about  how  the  collaboration  functions  shall  be  made  available. 
Paragraph 4  permits  the  creation of pre-arranged  train  paths.  This  enables  the 
operation  of  Trans  European  Rail  Freight  Freeways  as  outlined  in  the 
Commission's Communication COM  (97)  242  final.  Paragraph 4  requires  that 
such  train  paths  should  be  made  available  through  any  of the  participating 
infrastructure managers. 
Article 17 
51.  Paragraph  I  requires  the  preparation  of a  section  of the  network  statement 
describing the framework in which applications for capacity will  be considered. 
To enable  an  efficient allocation process  to  be carried out,  it  is  important that 
applicants understand the availability of  capacity on the infrastructure network and 
the rules and criteria which will be applied. This infonnation, which is required by 
paragraphs 2 and 3, fonns the framework within which applications for capacity 
will be judged and  must  be  clear and  available to  all  applicants.  It provides  a 
measure against which decisions may be judged and it provides guidance to enable 
applicants  to  make  infonned  requests.  Paragraph 4  requires  that the  statement 
should  specifically  address  measures  to  tackle  the  specific  needs  of freight, 
international and short notice services, which have tended to be poorly served in 
the past. To enable the statement to inform bids for capacity, paragraph 5 requires 
80 that the infrastructure manager should produce the network statement four months 
in advance of  the deadline for the timetabling process. 
Article 18 
52.  This article aims to  provide guidance on the type of issues that the infrastructure 
manager  will  need  to  address  in  its  capacity  allocation  statement.  The 
infrastructure manager is required to have regard to these issues, but how it reacts 
and addresses any issues which arise is legitimately a matter for which it should be 
free to make decisions. The list is not intended to be exhaustive, although it covers 
the principal areas of  concern. 
Article 19 
53.  This article defines which entities may apply for railway infrastructure capacity. 
The ability to bid for the right to capacity is totally distinct from the right of  access 
to the railway infrastructure to operate a train service. The latter right is governed 
under Community law by Directive 91/440/EEC and by national legislation where 
this provides for a greater degree of access. These rights of access are associated 
with  additional  requirements  governing  issues  such  as  licensing,  safety 
certification  and  compliance  with  other  appropriate  regulations  concerning 
operations of, for example, the rolling stock. 
54.  The ability to hold rights to railway capacity is linked to the ability to use rail for a 
transport service.  It  is  self evident that  railway  undertakings  need  to  have this 
possibility to enable them to  offer rail  transport services. It  is also the case that 
there are other parties with an equally legitimate interest in the use of rail for a 
transport  service,  these  will  include  purchasers  of public  passenger  services, 
combined transport operators and industry with large volumes of  freight. There are 
a variety of reasons why these parties may wish to have the right to hold capacity. 
In so  far  as  a market exists for  the  provision of train services, purchasers of a 
service may wish to have the  freedom  to  use  different railway undertakings to 
satisfy their business needs.  Where a business is taking a risk in developing or. 
operating a service then it is understandable and legitimate that it should also have 
the ability to  control the  factors  used  in running  its  business.  A customer of a 
railway  service  may  have  different  objectives  for  the  development  of their 
business,  which  may  even  conflict  with  the  business  objectives  of a  railway 
undertaking.  Businesses may  want greater assurance that their interests will  be 
safeguarded in the allocation process than can be provided by an intermediary. In 
the case of services carried out on contract to a public authority the authority may 
need to acquire the capacity'before it has selected the railway undertaking, it will 
need to ensure the continuity of services if the undertaking changes, and it needs 
to ensure that the outgoing undertaking does not seek to keep any of the capacity 
which is granted for those serviCes. 
55.  These arguments provide overwhelming evidence of the  need to  enable bodies 
other  than  railway  undertakings  with  a  legitimate  interest  to  seek  railway 
infrastructure capacity.  Paragraph  1 restricts the  ability to  apply for  capacity to 
authorised  applicants.  Paragraphs  2  and  3  permit  the  setting  of appropriate 
requirements to provide assurance that any body which submits a bid can do so in 
an appropriate manner and can pay any necessary penalties should the capacity bid 
for remain unused. 
81 56.  In all cases, the right to use of capacity allocated by the infrastructure manager 
rests with the body to whom it was allocated for the period of allocation. Where 
the operation of the service is contracted to a licensed railway undertaking, that 
undertaking does not acquire any right to the capacity used beyond the period for 
which they perform the service. 
Article 20 
57.  This article defines the means to provide applicants with longer-term assurance of 
capacity through entering into a framework agreement as set out in paragraph 1. 
Applicants need to have some certainty over the type of  rights that they enjoy and 
the likelihood that those rights will be available and usable for a period of  time in 
the future. This is important for undertakings' ability to win and retain customers, 
but  also  to  underpin  their  ability  to  carry  out  investments  in,  for  example, 
equipment and in developing the service. 
58.  The most desirable type of right will vary between traffic and operator types. It 
may be that local passenger services would benefit from relatively fixed schedules 
over a period of years, whereas for long distance passenger services this may be 
less important and for freight, the most important point may be to ensure that the 
departure  and arrival  times are  satisfactory.  While  these  framework  principles 
might  be  optimal  for  different  traffic  types,  the  challenge  is  to  ensure  that  a 
balance is struck between the competing needs. Assurance must be proportionate 
to  the  applicant's identifiable  needs and must not be  such as  to  prevent other 
applicants  with  a  legitimate  expectation to  be  able  to  operate  services  on the 
infrastructure  from  having  a  reasonable  expectation of acquiring  the necessary 
capacity. Providing rights that are too narrowly defined will create constraints on 
the network capacity, which can hamper the scheduling of  other services, while on 
the  other  hand,  too  little  security  will  deter  or hinder  development  of their 
· . business.  Paragraph  2  requires  that  the  arrangementS  do  not  prevent  other 
legitimate users from obtaining capacity on the network. 
59.  The  commitment must include explicit requirements  for  flexibility,  which will 
allow optimal use to be made of  available capacity. This is set out in paragraph 3, 
while paragraph 4 permits these to be accompanied by penalties if agreed. Long 
term  capacity  commitments  must  be  proportionate  to  need,  and  paragraph  5 
requires that they must not normally be allowed to be for longer than five years. 
Paragraph 6 requires that the nature of  the agreements entered into must be made 
public to ensure that any concerns about their effect can be addressed. Paragraph 7 
provides the means for authorised applicants that place a high value on meeting 
one or more particular characteristics of a service to purchase a greater degree of 
assurance that their commercial needs will be satisfied. However, this must reflect 
the cost that the additional inflexibility will impose upon the network. 
Article 21 
60.  This article determines the timing of the various steps in the allocation process. 
There  is  considerable  merit to  the ,  synchronisation  of the  timetabling  process 
across  infrastructure networks to facilitate  bidding for  paths which cross more 
than one network. A similar argument can be made to enable undertakings to more 
easily bid for capacity on another infrastructure network. In any case in view of 
the  unavoidable  linkage  between  the  international  allocation  processes  and 
82 national processes it  seems desirable to  propose a  synchronisation of the main 
elements  within  the  process.  Paragraph  2  therefore  defines  the  dates  of the 
major timetable  changes  as  well  as  the  maximum  period  beforehand  for  the 
submission of bids.  Specific mention is made of the timing of the international 
coordination which  must  take  place  in parallel  with the  national  processes  to 
ensure an optimal outcome. 
Article 22 
61.  This  article  determines  how  applicants  may  apply  for  capacity.  Paragraph  1 
requires that applicants must apply to the appropriate infrastructure manager for 
capacity. Paragraph 2 ensures that the application respects the deadlines for the 
process. Paragraph 3 requires that where an applicant has a framework agreement, 
then their application must conform to that agreement. Paragraphs 4 and 5 concern 
applications for capacity crossing more than one network. Paragraph 4 permits an 
application to be made to one of  the infrastructure managers who will coordinate 
the granting of capacity with other relevant infrastructUre managers. Alternatively 
paragraph 5 ensures that if infrastructure managers  ~reate any joint body for the 
allocation of  capacity on more than one network then an authorised applicant may 
apply directly to that body for capacity. 
Article 23 
62.  This  article  determines  how the  draft  timetable  shall  be created.  Paragraph  1 
places  a  requirement  on the  infrastructure  manager  to  attempt  to  satisfy  all 
properly submitted requests for capacity. In doing so, it must take account of the 
needs  of the  applicants.  Paragraph  2  requires  that  the  infrastructure  manager 
should treat all requests for capacity equally except as provided for where there is 
scarcity  of capacity  or  specialised  infrastructure.  Paragraph  3  requires  the 
infrastructure manager to consult interested parties about the draft timetable. This 
is to ensure that all parties have the opportunity to identify whether the draft will 
be unable to  satisfy their requirements and to provide an opportunity for  those 
problems to be resolved or for them to seek arbitration. It also provides time for 
possible  reallocation  of staff  or  rolling  stock  where  required.  Paragraph  4 
require the  infrastructure  manager to  take  appropriate  action  to  deal  with  any 
concerns raised. 
Article 24 
63.  This article describes the process to  be followed  where  conflicts arise between 
requests. It is inevitable that as demand for the use of  capacity rises on a section of 
the network that request for train paths may conflict. Measures need to be taken to 
ensure  that  while  attempting  to  respect  the  necessary  aspects  of the  paths 
requested, through making minor adjustments to  the  characteristics of the path 
it becomes  possible  to  accommodate  additional  requests.  This  is  set  out  in 
paragraphs 1 and  2.  Paragraph 3 establishes the principle that the infrastructure 
manager should seek to achieve an optimal resolution of conflicting requests for 
capacity. Paragraph 4 requires that the principles to be employed must be set out 
in the network statement.  Paragraph 5 establishes  the  principle that it is more 
desirable  to  attempt  to  satisfy  all  requests  for  capacity  than  to  prevent  the 
operation of  a requested service. 
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64.  This  article  describes  the  procedure  where  a  request  for  capacity  cannot  be 
adequately  satisfied  due  to  a  shortage  of capacity.  As  demand  for  train  paths 
increases it  will  become  increasingly difficult to  satisfy the requirements of the 
authorised  applicants.  Initially  this  may  require  minor  differences  between 
capacity requested and that allocated.  As demand increases, so the capacity that 
can be made available will  often be  unacceptable to users and it  is  possible that 
there may simply be no suitable capacity available at all.  The traditional solution 
to this issue was to  allocate priorities to different traffic types, which would then 
be allocated paths with the least important being squeezed out of the system first. 
There  are  a  number  of reasons  why  such  a  simple  approach  is  no  longer 
acceptable. Firstly the existence of  more than one railway undertaking may require 
decisions  which  require  choices  about comparable priority services of different 
railway undertakings. Secondly the system fails  to give due consideration to  the 
different requirements of  service types. 
65.  In  the  situation where scarcity arises the potential for  coordination will  already 
have been exhausted. Paragraph  I requires that in this situation, the infrastructure 
must be declared capacity constrained. Following this, paragraph 2 then requires a 
thorough analysis of the  scope  for  greater adjustments, than would  normally be 
considered  in  the  coordination  process.  Paragraph  3  permits  the  infrastructure 
manager,  when  it  must  make  a  choice  between  conflicting  requests,  after 
coordination has been carried out, to  base that choice on priority criteria which it 
has previously specified. Paragraph 4 requires that the priority criteria must take 
account of the  value  to  society of a  service  which  is  excluded relative  to  one 
which is not. This must also take account of the effect in other Member States, for 
example additional lorry traffic through the Alps if an international freight train is 
excluded from the network in Denmark. 
66.  Paragraph  5  notes  that  adequate  consideration  must  be  given  to  freight  and 
international freight when determining priorities. This implies that freight should 
not automatically be  allocated  least priority,  but that the  importance of services 
should  be  considered on  their  merits  and  in  particular the  implications  for  the 
development of rail services. Paragraph 6 requires that adequate steps are taken to 
enable short-notice requests, that is to say for traffic types which are not planned 
so  far  in  advance, to  receive  a  comparable chance of being granted capacity to 
those  within  the  timetabling  process.  The  infrastructure  manager  will  need  to 
employ a set of  pre determined rules to decide which traffic is to be excluded from 
the  network.  The  rules  shall  be  clear and  explicit and paragraph 7  requires  the 
rules which are applied to be published as part of the network statement. 
Article 26 
67.  The  purpose  of this  article  is  to  enable  greater  potential  flexibility  to  railway 
undertakings. Paragraph I requires that the infrastructure manager should be  able 
to respond rapidly to requests for capacity which are tabled outside the timetabling 
process. Paragraph 2 creates a requirement for infrastructure managers to be aware 
of the  extent to  which they  have  spare  capacity available  to  meet  requests  for 
capacity outside the normal scheduling process. This capacity is most likely to  be 
attractive to  freight  train operators and should enhance their ability to  compete 
with road haulage for  late  booked traffic or amendments to pre arranged traffic. 
84 Paragraph 3 requires information on the availability of spare capacity, which has 
been  identified,  to  be  supplied  to  all  likely  users.  Paragraph  4  requires  the 
publication of statistics showing the overall performance of  the allocation process. 
Article 27 
68.  This article replaces Articles 4(b) and 5 of Directive 95/19/EC, and makes special 
arrangements  for  certain infrastructures.  Paragraph  1 requires that infrastructure 
shall  normally  be  available  for  all  types  of service,  unless  suitable  alternative 
routes exist which are not capacity constrained. There will be circumstances where 
the  infrastructure  manager wishes  to  ensure  for  operational  reasons  either that 
specific types of service are accorded priority on a piece of infrastructure or that it 
is  necessary to  grant some rights  to  access,  perhaps  related  to  the  financing  of 
investment.  In  so  far  as  such  rights  are  not  in  contradiction  with  other  rules, 
paragraph  2  provides  for  them  to  be  permitted  after  consultation.  Typical 
examples might relate to a dedicated high speed line where the operation of other 
traffic types, even if  technically compatible might lead to dramatic reduction in the 
availability  of the  infrastructure  for  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  constructed. 
Similar arguments might apply where a link  is  intended  for  freight  services to 
keep them off a passenger line and its use by passenger services could inhibit that 
purpose.  Clearly the  extent to  which such  special  arrangements  may  be put in 
place must be proportionate to their need and effect. Paragraph 2 ensures that such 
arrangements  cannot  be  put  in  place  to  prevent  legitimate  requests  to  use  the 
infrastructure.  Paragraph 3  requires the  publication of such a designation in the 
network statement. 
Article 28 
69.  This  article  defines  what  is  meant  by  a  capacity  analysis  in  case  of scarcity. 
Railway infrastructure is a natural monopoly and  in the majority of cases this is 
likely  to  remain  the  case.  This coupled with  his  frequent  close  links  with the 
State implies that the  manager of the infrastructure is not forced  by a market to 
respond  in  an  economically  rational  manner.  This  may  result  in  sub-optimal 
behaviour with regard to  the  provision or  use  of capacity.  A key role therefore 
needs to be played by the State, either itself or through a regulatory body to ensure 
that  infrastructure  managers  do  behave  in  a manner that  is  consistent  with the 
interests of society and not simply their own interest. In particular, with regard to 
capacity allocation, processes are needed to  ensure that where capacity becomes 
scarce,  appropriate  measures  are  put  in  place  to  alleviate  this  situation  in  an 
appropriate manner. 
70.  Where any request is unable to be met, either because there is simply no capacity 
or the capacity available  is  so  far  from  what was requested as to  be effectively 
unusable  then  the  infrastructure  has  become  saturated  for  at  least  some  time 
period. This situation is  not necessarily of concern to  the infrastructure manager 
particularly if he is  able to  increase his  access charges in view of the scarcity. If 
the infrastructure manager is sufficiently commercially motivated then he is likely 
to  explore all  possible ways of extracting the maximum possible usage from his 
infrastructure. In situations where this is  not the case it is  desirable to  ensure that 
he  carries  out,  in  consultation with  railway  undertakings,  an assessment of the 
infrastructure  involved and the  apparent constraints.  These  requirements are  set 
out  in  paragraphs  1 and  2.  There  should  also  be  a thorough assessment of the 
85 competing  demands  around  the  time  of the  request  to  identify  what  possible 
methods  of  re-timing,  slowing  or  re-directing  traffic  could  enable  a  fuller 
accommodation of  the requested paths. This analysis may identify measures which 
enable the operation of further services, however if they do not then they should 
lead the infrastructure manager to  perform an assessment of possible methods of 
capacity enhancement and appropriate cost benefit analysis.  Paragraph 3 requires 
that all of  the interested parties should be consulted during the performance of the 
analysis. Paragraph 4 sets a time limit for the completion of  the analysis. 
Article 29 
71.  This  article  describes  the  nature  of a  capacity enhancement  plan.  Paragraph  1 
requires  that  where,  after  the  capacity  assessment  process,  the  infrastructure 
manager· still  cannot fully  satisfy  the  request  for  paths,  then  he  must within  6 
months cany out an assessment of the  potential  for  capacity expansion through 
investment. Paragraph 2 requires that such an assessment should take account of 
projected traffic alterations, should consider short and long term measures, should 
take account of their costs and benefits and the ability of operators to  pay those 
costs through higher access charges. The infrastructure manager shall consult all 
interested  railway  undertakings  on  the  conclusions  of the  assessment  before 
announcing its proposals for measures to alleviate the capacity scarcity. Where an 
infrastructure  manager has  carried  out  such  a  survey  and  is  implementing  the 
proposals agreed, it has no further need to  perform such a survey. Dependent on 
the outcome of this the infrastructure manager will  be  able to  develop plans for 
investment to alleviate the constraints. This plan should be set out and followed by 
him.  Paragraph 3 requires the plan to include a timetable for the implementation 
of  the measures. Paragraph 4 ensures that where, for reasons which he can control, 
the infrastructure manager fails to make progress to the timetable in the plan then, 
if requested by  the railway undertakings using the infrastructure which it covers, 
he must cease to levy any fees which arise from the shortage of  capacity. 
Article 30 
72.  This  article  requires  that  booked  capacity  must  be  used  or  returned  to  the 
infrastructure manager. The purpose of this  r~quirement is  to ensure optimal use 
of scarce  capacity.  Paragraph  1 permits  an  infrast~cture manager  to  impose 
requirements on the use of train paths that are booked. Paragraph 2 deals with the 
situation where there is  insufficient capacity to  meet all  requests.  In this case the 
infrastructure manager must request the surrender of any paths used for less than 
75% of the  booking over a period of at  least one month.  Paragraph 3 deals with 
the situation where coordination was required  but no  services were excluded.  In 
this case the infrastructure manager is  permitted to  require the surrender of paths 
which are used  for  less than 75% of the  booking over a  period of at  least  one 
month.  Paragraph  4  permits  the  infrastructure  manager  to  base  future  priority 
decisions on past perfom1ance in the utilisation ofbooked capacity. 
Article 31 
73.  This article describes the arrangements for  booking capacity for  maintenance of 
· the  railway infrastructure.  Paragraph  1 requires  that  bids  shall  be  submitted  for 
capacity to  undertake infrastructure maintenance. The infrastructure manager may 
be  making the allocation decision, and  may also be  the  body seeking capacity to 
86 carry out maintenance. In view of this paragraph 2 requires that adequate account 
be  taken of the  effect of the  capacity reserved  for  track  maintenance  on  other 
applicants for capacity. 
Article 32 
74.  This article describes arrangements for arbitration with the aim of offering a more 
rapid  resolution for  more  straightforward problems.  Many of the  decisions  that 
must be  taken during the allocation process involve matters of  judgement, and it 
would  be  surprising  if disagreements  did  not  arise.  Proper  consultation  and 
openness  about  the  process  and  criteria  used  should  help  to  ensure  a  better 
understanding of the limitations. In time this is  likely to result in  better bids for 
capacity  from  applicants.  Nevertheless,  it  is  quite  likely  that  there  will  be 
occasions where applicants feel that they have not been properly treated and would 
like  a second opinion.  In  addition because of the  constraints on the timetabling 
process,  it  is  desirable to  offer the parties the possibility of reaching agreement 
through some sort of  arbitration process rather than a lengthy appeal. Nonetheless, 
it is clear that the existence of an arbitration process neither prevents an appeal to 
the regulatory body,  nor to  seek a judicial ruling on any  decision.  Paragraph  1 
requires an infrastructure manager to  ensure that an arbitration procedure exists 
both when it carries out the allocation process and where it collaborates with other 
infrastructure  managers.  It also  requires  that  arrangements  exist  to  enable  a 
decision to be reached in ten working days. 
75.  Paragraph 2 requires each party to  an arbitration to  pay  its  own costs, with any 
other costs shared equally between them. Paragraph 3 ensures that when choosing 
to agree to arbitration, the parties commit themselves to  providing the necessary 
information and to abide by the decision reached. 
Article 33 
76.  The right to appeal against decisions of the infrastructure manager is fundamental, 
Article  13  of Directive  95/19/EC  ensured that  in  all  Member States  a  right  of 
appeal  must  exist  with  regard  to  the  charging  of  fees  or  applications  for 
railway infrastructure capacity to  operate services permitted under Article  10  of 
Directive 91/440/EEC. Those decisions must be made within two  months of all 
information being available.  However,  it  is  important that the  ability  to  appeal 
must cover not only the actual decision but also the rules and criteria which set the 
frarriework for the decision. In view of the complexity of the issues involved, it is 
desirable  that  this  appeal  body  should  be  a  specialised  body  with  detailed 
knowledge of the  railway sector and in particular the allocation process.  In  any 
case  it  is  likely  that,  given  the  existing requirement  for  a  decision  within two 
months, this process cannot be dealt with by the courts. 
77.  This article sets out the requirements for a regulatory body to be established for 
rail  infrastructure  networks.  This  requirement  supersedes  the  provision  of 
Directive 95/ 19/EC, and the  regulatory body will have wider powers to oversee 
the  charging  and  capacity allocation  processes  rather than to  provide  only  the 
possibility  of appeal.  The  latter  possibility  still  exists,  but  the  possibility  for 
arbitration  in  the  capacity  allocation  procedures,  and  the  requirement  in  this 
proposal  to  oversee  elements  of the  charging  scheme  should  reduce  the  need 
for appeals. 
87 78.  Paragraph  1 requires  that  this  body  must  be  completely  independent of all  the 
parties involved.  Paragraph 2 sets out the  areas where the  regulatory body must 
have the power to  take action.  Paragraph 3 requires that negotiation may only be 
employed  as  part  of the  process  of setting  infrastructure  charges  under  the 
supervision of the regulatory body.  Paragraph 4 ensures that the regulatory body 
shall have the power to request information which it requires to make its decisions 
while paragraph 5 requires that a decision must be taken within two months of  any 
complaint to the regulatory body. Paragraph 6 provides for it to have the power to 
impose conditions on all  relevant parties.  Paragraph 8 ensures that any decision 
that it takes must be open to review in a court. 
79.  Each  national  regulatory  body  clearly  only  has  a  remit  to  consider  allocation 
complaints in the territory in which it is established. In the case of charges this is 
unlikely to be a problem because the charge will be levied for the use of  a specific 
element of infrastructure. If charges are set which make an international service 
uneconomic, then they can be challenged in the State where they are set. However, 
applicants  for  capacity  which  crosses  more  than  one  Member  State  may  be 
unhappy with allocation decisions  taken  but be  unable to  pinpoint  a  particular 
infrastructure manager which they believe  has  not  acted appropriately,  possibly 
because the decision was taken by a joint organisation. This situation implies the 
need for an international appeal body. However desirable this might be, providing 
such an appeal body would present a number of difficulties. In particular it might 
be  controversial to  create  a body which  has  the  necessary legal  powers,  and  it 
could  also  prove  difficult  to  achieve  this  through  a  directive  addressed  to  the 
Member States. Nonetheless, it of course remains possible for a party which feels 
that  it  has  been  treated  in  a  manner  which  contravenes  the  competition 
requirements of the Treaty to bring this to the notice of the Commission. In view 
of these considerations it is not proposed at this stage that an appeal body should 
be established to deal with problems arising from the international allocation of 
railway capacity. 
Article 34 
80.  This article replicates those  parts of Directive 95/19/EC which deal  with safety 
certification issues. No changes are made to any of these provisions, and in view 
of this, paragraph I is required to ensure that the scope of this article is the same 
as that covered by the safety article in the preceding Directive. 
Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 
81.  These articles deal with the coming into force of the proposal and the need for the 
Commission to  report on the effects, four  years after entry into force  along with 
any recommendations on further action. 
88 Article 37 
82.  This article repeals  Directive 95/19/EC  as  well  as  two  other Regulations and  a · 
Decision relating to charges that are superseded by this proposal. 
83.  There is in existence a considerable quantity of Community legislation relating to 
rail  transport.  Those  texts  which  address  the  question  of charges  should  be 
reconsidered when putting forward this proposal. Regulations (EEC) No 2830/77 
and (EEC) No 2183/78 and Council Decision 82/529/EEC in particular appear to 
fall  in this  category.  Regulation (EEC)  No  2830/77  lays  down measures which 
were considered to be necessary to achieve comparability between the accounting 
systems  and  annual  accounts  of  railway  undertakings.  Regulation  (EEC) 
No 2183/78  lays  down  uniform  costing  principles  for  railway  undertakings 
charging for international full train freight traffic.  Council Decision 82/529/EEC 
relates to the fixing of  rates for the international carriage of  goods by rail. 
84.  In view of their age, both Regulations do not reflect the changed railway industry 
in a number of  ways. In particular, both are only addressed to a limited number of 
railway  undertakings  one  of which  no  longer  exists,  and  neither  reflect  the 
accounting separation required in Directive 911440/EEC, nor the fact that in many 
Mer:nber  States  that  there  is  a  separation  of the  function  of Infrastructure 
Management from Railway undertakings. 
85.  Regulation (EEC) No 2830/77 lays down measures which were considered to be 
necessary to  achieve comparability between the  accounting  systems  and  annual 
accounts of railway undertakings. With the development of a proper market for 
rail transport in the Community, it should be of considerably less importance for 
there  to  be  comparability  between  railway  accounting  systems.  The  current 
proposal  requires  sufficient  information to  be  made  available  by  Infrastructure 
Managers to ensure that railway undertakings can be confident that they are being 
required  to  pay  a  legitimate  charge.  In  addition  Community  rules  governing 
company accounts should also ensure a reasonable degree of  conformity. 
86.  Regulation (EEC) No 2183/78 lays down uniform costing principles for railway 
undertakings for  charging for  international full  train freight  traffic  Many of the 
cost factors referred to in the Regulation are infrastructure cost factors which are 
covered in  this  proposal.  Such a legal  framework  is  in  addition only necessary 
where the market is  insufficiently developed to  ensure rational behaviour by the 
undertakings.  Directive  911440/EEC  has  provided  the  first  steps  toward  the 
creation of a proper market for  railway services and many Member States have 
gone  further.  These  developments  provide  for  the  possibility  of competing 
operators and therefore make the regulation an anachronism. 
87.  Therefore,  in  view  of the  fact  that  in  many  ways  both  of these  regulations 
no longer  reflect  the  structure  of  the  industry  and  that  they  will  be 
largely superseded by  this  proposal,  Regulations  (EEC)  No 2183/78  and 
(EEC) No 2830/77 are repealed. 
89 88.  Council  Decision 82/529/EEC also  no  longer retlects the  changed nature of the 
rail  market.  The  Decision  is  based  upon  Council  Decision  75/327/EEC  which 
itself  was  repealed  by  Directive  911440/EEC.  As  with  the  Regulations,  the 
Decision is  only addressed to a  limited  number of railway undertakings  one of 
which no  longer exists. The Decision is  however no  longer compatible with the 
situation  created  by  Directive  911440/EEC  which  creates  the  possibility  of 
competing intt:rnational rail freight services. This possibility means that the fixing 
of rates  between undertakings as  foreseen  in  the  Decision could  run  counter to 
Article 85 of  the Treaty. In addition, the commercial independence and managerial 
freedom  which  was  sought  by  the  Decision  to  enable  the  setting  of different 
tariffs for  international  freight  services  is  now  enshrined  in  Article  4  of 
Directive 911440/EEC. In view of these factors there is no objective reason for the 
continued existence of  this Decision and it is therefore repealed. 
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